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ABSTRACT 
VALUES AND RISK PERCEPTION: 
A CROSS-CULTURAL EXAMINATION 
Güvenç, Gülbanu 
Ph.D., Department of Management 
Supervisor: Prof. Dilek Önkal 
February 2008 
 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between 
individual values and risk perception of terror attacks. This relationship is 
examined via a study employing university students from Turkey (n = 536) and 
Israel (n = 298). Those two countries share an ongoing threat of terror attacks, but 
differ in their socio-cultural backgrounds. Schwartz Value Theory (1992; 1994) is 
used to conceptualize and measure values. Cognitive and emotional responses 
about (1) potentially being exposed to a terror attack, and (2) a terror attack 
potentially occurring in the country are assessed to measure risk perception. 
Results partly support the hypotheses by showing expected associations of values 
with risk perception, as well as indicating gender differences and cultural 
variations. The more importance the Turkish and Israeli participants attribute to 
self-direction values, the less emotional they feel about the threat of being 
exposed to a terror attack. However, the greater priority they attribute to security 
  iv 
values, the more negative affect they express about both threats. Furthermore, the 
more importance they give to hedonism & stimulation values, the less likely they 
perceive the likelihood of both threats. Current findings are discussed in relation 
to previous results, theoretical approaches, and practical implications. 
  
Keywords: Terror, Risk Perception, Values, Cross-Cultural Comparisons 
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ÖZET 
DEĞERLER VE RİSK ALGILAMASI: 
KÜLTÜRLERARASI BİR İNCELEME 
Güvenç, Gülbanu 
Doktora, İşletme Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Dilek Önkal 
Şubat 2008 
 
 
 
Bu araştırmada temel amacımız değerler ve terör saldırılarına ilişkin risk 
algılaması arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektir. Araştırmanın katılımcıları Türk (n = 
536) ve İsrail’li (n = 298) üniversite öğrencileridir. Türkiye ve İsrail halen devam 
eden terör saldırılarına maruz kalan fakat sosyokültürel geçmişleri farklılık 
gösteren iki ülkedir. Bu araştırmada, değerler Schwartz Değer Kuramı (1992) 
kullanılarak kavramlaştırılmış ve ölçülmüştür. Risk algılamasını ölçmek için terör 
saldırısına bireysel olarak maruz kalma ve ülkede terör saldırısı gerçekleşmesi 
tehditleriyle ilgili  bilişsel ve duygusal dışavurumlar kullanılmıştır. Araştırma 
sonuçları, öngörülen hipotezlerin kısmen gerçekleştiğini, değerler ve risk 
algılaması arasında anlamlı bir ilişkinin var olduğunu göstermekte, ayrıca cinsiyet 
farklılıklarını ve kültürel farklılıkları vurgulamaktadır. Türk ve İsrail’li 
katılımcıların özyönelim değer tipine verdikleri önem arttıkça, terrör saldırısına 
maruz kalma tehditine ilişkin hissettikleri olumsuz duyguların şiddeti 
  vi 
azalmaktadır. Öte yandan, güvenlik değer tipine verdikleri önem arttıkça her iki 
tehdite ilişkin hissettikleri duyguların şiddeti artmaktadır. Ayrıca, “hazcılık & 
uyarılım” değer tipine verdikleri önem arttıkça her iki tehditin gerçekleşmesine 
yönelik yaptıkları tahminler azalmaktadır. Araştırmanın bulguları geçmiş 
çalışmalar, kuramsal yaklaşımlar ve pratik uygulamalarla ilişkilendirilerek 
tartışılmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Terör, Risk Algılaması, Değerler, Kültürlerarası Karşılaştırma 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
The September 11th attacks in the USA and the subsequent terrorist bombings in a 
number of European cities including Istanbul, Madrid and London have raised 
people’s awareness about terrorism. As a result, individuals feel that they are 
becoming potential targets of a serious threat. Personal threats that pose a physical 
danger are likely to be very affectively arousing and to elicit fear to a greater 
degree (Huddy et al., 2002). In a similar vein, the Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework (Kasperson et. al., 1988; Kasperson, 1992; Renn et al., 1992) states 
that certain kinds of hazards and accidents are especially likely to lead to 
widespread and strong concerns. For example, radiation and nuclear power 
hazards are claimed to potentially cause ripple effects. Regarding the terror 
attacks, the ripple effects of public fear produce more costs than the direct losses 
(Shiloh et al., 2007). For example, many Americans preferred driving to flying 
after the September 11th attacks in their attempts to avoid the risk of terror. 
However, their attempts caused a higher death toll by car accidents (Gigerenzer, 
2004; 2006).  
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As a result of its high costs, terrorism has become an important topic for 
the field of risk analysis. Risk analysis focuses on issues of risk assessment and 
risk management. Risk assessment is usually located in the domain of natural 
sciences, and includes the processes of identification, quantification, and 
characterization. Risk management is often placed in the domain of politics, 
legislation, and the social sciences, and concentrates on processes of 
communication, mitigation and decision making. A crucial role of social sciences 
in risk management is to reflect research regarding how to create and 
communicate information that meets the needs of those who must deal with risks 
(Fischhoff, 2006). Therefore, risk communicators must understand the complex 
factors influencing risk perceptions in order to tailor their messages appropriately 
to the target groups or individuals.  
 
From the perspective of social sciences, risk is often viewed as being 
inherently subjective rather than being an abstract expression of uncertainty or 
loss (Krimsky and Golding, 1992; Slovic, 1999). Thus, risk is a value-laden entity 
dependent on our minds and cultures.  In line with this view, risk perception 
involves people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgments and feelings, as well as the wider 
social or cultural values and dispositions that people adopt towards hazards and 
their benefits (Pidgeon et al., 1992). This broad definition implies the 
multidimensional characteristics of threats that people evaluate in their 
perceptions. 
 
The Cultural Theory of Risk (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982; Douglas, 
1992; Dake, 1991; 1992) and the Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
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(Kasperson et. al., 1988; Kasperson, 1992; Renn et al., 1992) have attempted to 
explain the underlying factors that shape people’s risk perceptions. In the former 
theory, perceived risk is seen as a collective phenomenon in which every cultural 
group chooses to attend to some risks and ignore others to maintain their 
particular way of life. In the latter theory, risk is conceived as a socially 
constructed phenomenon shaped by individuals and groups across different 
cultural/societal contexts. Although these theories have made important 
contributions to the literature, they are not without critics as explained in the 
following chapters of this thesis. More recent studies have suggested affect as an 
important variable that influences risk perception (eg., Finucane et al., 2000; 
Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Slovic et al., 2007).  
 
Only a few studies have examined the perceptions of terror threats or the 
factors affecting these perceptions (Goodwin et al., 2005; Fischhoff et al., 2005; 
Lavi and Salomon, 2005; Shiloh et al., 2007). One of these studies is a cross-
cultural research between Turkey and Israel that explores cognitive and emotional 
perceptions of terror attacks (Shiloh et al., 2007).  Differences are found between 
the two countries in the perceived salience of specific factors despite a common 
structure of terror risk perception. Further research is suggested to investigate the 
effects of social processes on risk perception.  
 
The present thesis aims to examine the relationships between individual 
values and risk perception of terror attacks in two countries, Turkey and Israel. 
These two countries share an ongoing threat of terror attacks, but differ in their 
socio-cultural backgrounds. To the best of my knowledge, Turkish and Israeli 
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cultures have not been compared yet with regard to the relationship between 
values and risk perception of terror attacks.  
 
Schwartz Value Theory (1992; 1994) is applied to examine the value 
structures of Turkish and Israeli participants. According to this theory, values 
represent the motivational goals that guide individuals to satisfy their needs and 
societal demands. The four important facets of the theory can be summarized as 
follows: (1) the value contents are classified according to motivational goals, (2) 
the motivational goals result from the three universal requirements of all 
individuals and societies, (3) there are congruent and competing relationships 
among values that are portrayed in a circular structure, and (4) this circular 
structure stimulates hypothesizing about the relationships of values to other 
variables in an integrated manner. The Schwartz Value Theory (1992; 1994) has 
been empirically assessed among 210 samples from 67 countries located on every 
inhabited continent. The empirical results have demonstrated a comprehensive 
and near universal set of values identified by the theory. It was found that values 
explained approximately twice as much variance in macro worries as in micro 
worries regarding direct and salient threats because individual differences in 
coping ability are likely to influence the incidence and intensity of micro values 
regarding these threats (Schwartz, 2000). Furthermore, several individual and 
wider group-level factors are likely to underlie how an individual perceives terror 
threats (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). Therefore, the relationships of values with risk 
perception are examined at both personal and national level. In particular, both 
 5  
 
risk perception about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that 
may occur in the country are assessed. 
 
In the present thesis, risk perception is defined as a combination of 
cognitive and negative emotional responses to perceived threats. Cognitive 
components of risk perception include perceived likelihood and perceived 
severity, whereas emotional component consists of eight negative emotions. Risk 
perceptions about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that 
may occur in the country are measured by Terror Risk Perception Survey. This 
survey is developed for use in current research. The importance attributed to 
individual values is assessed by using Schwartz Value Survey (1992; 1994). 
  
The organization of this dissertation is as follows: in the next chapter (i.e., 
Chapter 2) a literature review on risk perception and values is presented along 
with their implications for the present study. Research hypotheses along with the 
theoretical link between values and risk perception are introduced in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 reports the methodology of the current research. The results are 
provided in Chapter 5. The first part of this chapter presents the findings about 
values. In the second part, the results about risk perception of terror attacks are 
introduced. The third part reports the findings regarding the relationship between 
values and risk perception. The last chapter (i.e., Chapter 6) of this dissertation is 
devouted to a general discussion, conclusions and directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
ON RISK PERCEPTION AND VALUES  
 
 
 
2.1. Risk Perception 
 
The beginning of risk perception research can be traced to the 1970s, when 
discrepancies were observed between the perceptions of lay people and experts 
about environmental and technological hazards. Thus, risk perception research 
was developed to identify the reasons for the gap between expert and lay 
perceptions.  
 
In the early 1970’s, the gap between expert and lay perceptions was 
attributed to the availability heuristic, which was developed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973). These researchers showed that people do not make valid 
intuitive judgments of probabilities (as defined and computable by probability 
calculus), but rather they are influenced by irrelevant factors and the availability 
of evidence. Thus, vividly described, emotionally charged possibilities will be 
perceived as being more likely than those that are harder to picture or are difficult 
to understand, resulting in a corresponding cognitive bias.  For example, 
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Lichtenstein et al. (1978) invoked the concept of availability to explain why the 
judged frequencies of highly publicized causes of death such as accidents, 
homicides, or cancer were relatively overestimated and why under-publicized 
causes such as diabetes, strokes, or asthma were underestimated. As a result, the 
discrepancy between the perceptions of lay people and experts led to a distinction 
between objective or statistical risk and subjective or perceived risk. The former 
refers to risk as defined and measured by experts, whereas the latter refers to non-
expert or lay misperceptions of that objective risk. In contrast to this view, 
Fischhoff et al. (1978) claimed that public risk perception could not simply be 
attributed to irrationality because of the reliance on a heuristic approach but rather 
it is much more multidimensional. The psychometric model developed by these 
researchers is presented in the next section. 
 
 
2.1.1. The Psychometric Model 
 
Fischhoff et al., (1978) developed a cognitive model that analyzed people’s 
expressed preferences. In particular, they found that two main qualitative features 
seem to drive risk perceptions: unknown risk and dread risk. The unknown risk 
factor reflects the extent to which a hazard is unknown, unobservable, unfamiliar, 
and has delayed consequences. The dread risk factor reflects the extent to which a 
hazardous activity or technology is seen as dreaded, uncontrollable, fatal, not 
equitable, a high risk to future generations, not easily reduced, involuntary, and 
potentially catastrophic. Furthermore, Fischhoff et al. (1982) showed that experts 
and lay people used different criteria when judging the risk from technological 
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hazards. Experts based their risk rating on the probability of fatality. On the 
contrary, lay people’s evaluations appeared to be influenced by other perceived 
characteristics of the hazard, one of which is subjective probability of risk. These 
studies demonstrate that dread is the major determinant of public perception and 
acceptance of risk. 
 
Several more extensive studies have expanded on the psychometric model 
of Fischhoff et al. (1978) both in terms of the scales used and in terms of the 
number of respondents. These studies led to a taxonomy of hazards, which is 
useful for understanding and predicting responses to risks. Furthermore, the 
resulting cognitive maps appear to be quite robust when international groups of 
lay people as well as experts judge diverse hazards (Peters and Slovic, 1996). The 
model has also been used as a basis for extensive work on risk communication 
(Sjoberg, 2000).  
 
While the psychometric studies on risk perception have extended our 
knowledge of people’s responses to risk and provided a new language for 
analyzing risk perceptions, they have also been subjected to a good deal of critical 
scrutiny. For example, Sjoberg (2000) argued that the psychometric model in its 
traditional form explains only a modest share of the variance of perceived risk. 
Pidgeon et al (1992) indicated that participants in these psychometric studies were 
not able to say what was really relevant to them about the question under 
investigation because of the researcher-defined rating scales. Finally, Spicer and 
Chamberlain (1996) criticized the psychometric model for not going beyond 
cognitive algebra.  
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2.1.2. Affect in Risk Perception Research 
 
The way that a person thinks about a hazard and organizes information about it is 
obviously important for understanding risk perception. However, studies have 
suggested that how a person feels about a hazard or its risk influences perceived 
risk of this hazard (Slovic et al, 1991; Alhakami and Slovic, 1994; Peters and 
Slovic, 1996; Finucane et al., 2000). More recently, Slovic et al. (2007) stated that 
people make judgments using an affect heuristic, a mental shortcut by which a 
person judges the risks and benefits of a hazard by accessing their pool of positive 
and negative feelings associated with that hazard.  
 
“Dual process theory” introduced by Epstein (1994) and the “Risk as 
feelings hypothesis” postulated by Loewenstein et al. (2001) may explain why 
affect influences people’s risk perception. Epstein asserted that people 
comprehend their reality through two interactive, parallel processing systems. One 
is the rational system, a deliberative analytical system that functions by way of 
established rules of logic and evidence. The experiential system, however, 
encodes reality in images, metaphors, and narratives to which affective feelings 
have become attached. Slovic et al (2004) indicated that most risk analysis is 
handled quickly and automatically by affect through the experiential mode of 
thinking.  
 
In congruence with the argument of Epstein (1994), Loewenstein et al., 
(2001) presented a “risk as feelings” hypothesis and posited that emotional 
reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of these 
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risks, because these feelings may be determined by other factors, such as the 
immediacy of a risk. Interestingly, when such a divergence occurs, emotional 
reactions often determine the judgment. However, in the traditional models of 
choice under risk or uncertainty, people are assumed to evaluate risky alternatives 
at a cognitive level, based largely on the probability and the desirability of 
associated consequences.  
 
Overall, these studies suggest that risk perception is not a pure cognitive 
process but rather a combination of affective and cognitive factors. Cognitive 
factors that contribute to people’s risk perception often include perceived 
likelihood, perceived severity, and other subjective features of the threat, like 
familiarity and availability. The current study focuses on perceived likelihood and 
perceived severity, in addition to affect. Therefore, a brief literature review of 
studies on perceived likelihood and severity is introduced in the next section.  
 
 
2.1.3. The Cognitive Factors: Perceived Likelihood and Perceived 
Severity  
 
Perceived likelihood, also called perceived vulnerability, perceived susceptibility 
or perceived risk, denotes the chance of the potential harm occurring. Perceived 
likelihood plays an important role in people’s risk perception, because it shows 
how likely a person perceives the exposure of herself or others to any threat. 
Nevertheless, people do not make the same likelihood judgments when they rate 
the risk to themselves, to their family, or to people in general, because “risk to 
self” and “risk to others” are not equivalent concepts in their perceptions (Pahl et 
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al., 2005). Accordingly, measuring perceived likelihood becomes a difficult task 
for risk perception researchers.  
 
Sjoberg (2000) argued that people often claim to be less subjected to risk 
than others are. This phenomenon is called unrealistic optimism bias and was first 
introduced by Weinstein (1980) and then emphasized in several studies of risk 
perception (eg., Perlof and Fetzer, 1986; Klar et al., 1996; Weinstein et al., 1996).  
 
Perceived severity indicates, if a hazardous outcome occurs, how serious 
people think it will be (Weinstein, 1999). Severity is mainly perceived through 
beliefs about consequences. Consequence beliefs include abstract-conceptual 
knowledge and concrete-perceptual images regarding physical or mental harm, 
social consequences, and other outcomes of the hazard (Cameron, 2003). Nearly 
all of the risk perception models contain severity. However, the terminology 
differs among studies. For example, in the psychometric model, immediate-
delayed consequences, catastrophic potential, and fatality indicate perceived 
severity. In the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, the dimension of anticipated 
consequences expresses severity.  
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2.1.4. Cultural Theory of Risk 
  
Including psychological factors in risk perception research is necessary but not 
sufficient to understand people’s perception of risk. A systematic examination 
into the socio-cultural basis of different risk perceptions is also needed (Finucane 
and Holup, 2005). Accordingly, risk perception studies have begun to account 
more explicitly for socio-cultural factors. One outstanding area of empirical 
development focuses on the idea of worldviews, which is broadly based on 
cultural theory of risk. Dake (1991) defined worldviews as deeply held beliefs and 
values regarding society, its functioning and its potential fate. In the cultural 
theory of risk, perceived risk is seen as a collective phenomenon in which every 
cultural group chooses to attend to some risks and ignore others to maintain their 
particular way of life (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). 
  
Using Douglas’ (1970) “group-grid” typology, the cultural theory is based 
on a model that identifies several cosmological features of a society, including 
individualism, solidarism, hierarchy and egalitarianism. The group dimension in 
the grid-group model represents the degree to which a person’s life is engaged in 
and sustained by group membership. Those with an individualistic or a low group 
orientation expect people to fend for themselves, and therefore tend to be 
competitive; those with a high group or individualistic orientation expect 
individuals to fend for themselves and therefore tend to be competitive; those with 
a high group or solidaristic worldview assume that people will interact frequently, 
in a wide range of activities for which they must depend on one another. The grid 
dimension measures the pervasiveness and significance of social differentiation 
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within a worldview. People who have a high-grid or hierarchical orientation 
justify inequality on the grounds that specialization and division of labor enable 
them to live together with greater harmony and effectiveness. Low grid 
orientations indicate an egalitarian state of affairs in which differences are 
opposed between races, income levels, men and women, and citizens (Wildavsky, 
1987). 
 
According to the cultural theory of risk, hierarchists would express great 
concern about behaviors such as demonstrations and civil disobedience because 
they see these acts as disrespectful to the authority they wish to maintain. They 
are also predicted to express concern about social deviance. Egalitarians would 
reject the prescriptions associated with hierarchy because they are against 
inequality. They are predicted to perceive the dangers associated with technology 
to be great. Individualists support self-regulation, in particular, the freedom to bid 
and bargain. They would be concerned about issues like the stability of the 
investment climate, the national debt, and government overregulation.  
 
Building on the works of Douglas and Wildavsky, Dake (1991, 1992) 
measured worldviews using attitudinal survey techniques and correlated these 
findings to risk perception. Peters and Slovic (1996) incorporated Dake’s 
worldview scales into an integrated model of the influences on risk perception. 
Their findings broadly followed the pattern observed by Dake. Similarly, other 
empirical studies showed that worldviews explain variance in lay and expert 
perceptions of various types of environmental and technological hazards (Palmer, 
1996; Marris et al, 1998; Slovic et al, 1999). 
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The cultural theory of risk has also been subjected to several criticisms. 
For example, Bellaby (1990) questioned the theory’s ability to account for group 
transitions and the context dependence of socio-cultural views and values. 
Boholm (1996) argued that the theory has not been adequately operationalized to 
measure worldviews. Similarly, Sjoberg (1998) demonstrated that the worldview 
scales do not seem particularly well suited for the task of explaining technological 
and environmental concerns and perceived risks. However, cultural theory of risk 
has been particularly interesting to some practitioners for the reason that it can 
allegedly explain the risk perceptions of technology and of environmental issues. 
In addition, Sjoberg (1997) found little support for cultural theory in research 
conducted in Brazil and Sweden and concluded that the theory explained only a 
minor share of variance in perceived risk ratings.  
 
The cultural theory of risk denotes that risk perception does not occur in a 
social vacuum. Accordingly, risk perception is not solely a matter of individual 
cognition and affect but also corresponds to the social processes. However, the 
major problem of cultural theory is its operationalization. Furthermore, the theory 
was developed to demonstrate the systematic relationship between worldviews 
and societal threats. Thus, it may not apply to personal threats.  
 
 
2.1.5. Social Amplification of Risk Framework 
 
The Social Amplification of Risk Framework denotes the phenomenon by which 
information processes, institutional structures, social-group behavior, and 
individual responses shape the social experience of risk, thereby contributing the 
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risk consequences (Kasperson et. al., 1988; Kasperson, 1992; Renn et al., 1992). 
Accordingly, this framework has attempted to integrate psychological, social and 
cultural approaches to risk perception.  
 
Social amplification is triggered by the occurrence of an adverse event 
such as an outbreak of a disease, or a terrorist bombing. This event must be an 
unknown risk and have potential consequences for a wide range of people.  The 
detrimental impact of such an event sometimes extends far beyond the direct 
damages to victims and property through the process of risk amplification (eg., 
group of scientists, the mass media, government agencies and politicians)  and 
may result in massive indirect impacts. For example, fat used in animal feed in 
Belgium was inadvertently contaminated with cancer-causing dioxin in 1999. The 
feed was later fed to chickens, swine, and other food animals and potentially 
contaminated these food products. As a result, countries around the world issued 
different combinations of temporary consumer advisories, import bans, and 
import alerts about potentially contaminated foods and animals from Belgium. 
The estimated cost of this food safety incident to the Belgian economy was about 
$750 million (Buzby, 2000).  
 
One drawback of the social amplification framework is that it may be too 
general to subject to empirical test (Pidgeon et al., 1992). Furthermore, it is not 
always clear what the risk consequences of risk amplification might be because 
the link between perception and action may be more complex than implied in the 
framework (Renn, 1991). 
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Consequently, it may be argued that both Cultural Theory of Risk and 
Social Amplification of Risk Framework have made important contributions to 
risk perception literature by emphasizing the role of social/cultural processes. 
However, the operationalization of these two approaches appears problematic. 
The current research suggests another approach—the Schwartz Value Theory—to 
examine the effects of social context on risk perception. For this reason, a 
literature review on values and the Schwartz Value Theory (1992) are provided in 
the following section. 
 
 
 
2.2. Values 
 
Values represent the motivational goals that serve as guiding principles in 
people’s lives (Rokeach, 1973). Relationships among different values reflect the 
psychological dynamics of conflict and compatibility that people experience in 
everyday life. When values are used to characterize cultures, what is sought are 
the socially shared, abstract ideas about what is good, right, and desirable in a 
society or other bounded cultural group (Smith and Schwartz, 1980).  
 
The present research aims to investigate the effects of individual 
differences in value priorities on individual attributes of risk perception. 
Therefore, the literature review on values will focus on individual values. In the 
first section, Rokeach’s approach regarding values is introduced. In the other 
sections, the Schwartz Value Theory (1992) and research regarding this theory are 
presented. 
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2.2.1. The Rokeach Value Survey 
 
We all live in societies, in which we have to cope both with our own needs and 
societal demands. Rokeach (1979) argued that when individual needs and societal 
goals somehow combine, they become cognitively presented values. Values, in 
turn, guide us to satisfy these needs. Rokeach (1973) aimed to classify values 
according to the social institutions that specialize in maintaining, enhancing, and 
mainly transmitting them. Therefore, he developed a survey by screening the large 
number of values in the literature. The Rokeach Value Survey consists of 36 
values, 18 of which are terminal, and the remainder consists of instrumental or 
means values. The former refer to beliefs or conceptions about ultimate goals or 
desirable end states of existence (such as happiness and wisdom); the latter refer 
to beliefs or conceptions about desirable modes of behavior to attain the desirable 
end states (such as behaving honestly or responsibly). Rokeach succeeded in the 
conceptualization of values. However, he could not elaborate on value 
classification, because he did not have a theory-based approach. 
 
 
2.2.2. The Schwartz Value Theory 
 
Schwartz (1992) developed a theoretical framework in order to classify value 
contents. According to this framework, the type of motivational goals expressed 
by values is the means for the distinction. Furthermore, he stated that these 
motivational goals are the results of three universal requirements with which all 
individuals and societies must cope: the needs of people as biological organisms, 
the requisites of coordinated social interaction, and the requirements for the 
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smooth functioning and survival of groups. The ten motivationally distinct value 
types are defined in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Definition of Value Types (Schwartz, 1992) 
 
Power: Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources 
(authority, social power, wealth, preserving my public image) 
 
Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to 
social standards (ambitious, successful, capable, influential) 
 
Hedonism: Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life, 
self-indulgent) 
 
Stimulation: excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (daring a varied life, an 
exciting life) 
 
Self-Direction: Independent thought and action, choosing, creating, exploring 
(creativity, freedom, independent, choosing own goals, curious) 
 
Universalism: Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature (equality, social justice, wisdom, broad-
minded, protecting the environment, unity with nature, a world of beauty) 
 
Benevolence: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom 
one is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible) 
 
Tradition: Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that 
traditional culture or religion provide (devout, respect for tradition, humble, 
moderate) 
 
Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social expectations and norms (self-discipline, politeness, 
honoring parents and elders, obedience) 
 
Security: Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self 
(family security, national security, social order, clean, reciprocation of favors) 
 
 
Schwartz (1992; 1994) also specified a set of dynamic relationships among 
values. Rokeach (1973) first emphasized a similar view that at least some type of 
values might be interdependent. However, other researchers following Rokeach 
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assumed value independence while making empirical classifications among values 
(eg., Braithwaite and Law, 1985; Feather and Peay, 1975; Hofstede, 1980; 
Maloney and Katz, 1976). The key to identifying the structure of value 
relationships is the assumption that actions in the pursuit of each type of value 
have psychological, practical, and social consequences that may conflict or may 
be compatible with the pursuit of other value types (Schwartz, 1994). Figure 1 
illustrates the pattern of conflicting and competing relationships among values. 
While competing values are in close proximity, conflicting ones lie at the opposite 
point on the circle. The circular structure presents a continuum of related 
motivations. Therefore, Schwartz (1994) argues that the whole set of ten values 
relates to any other variable in an integrated manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical model of relations among motivational types of values (Source: 
Schwartz, S.H. 1992. “Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical 
Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries”, In M. Zanna, eds.,  Advances in 
Experimental Social Psychology 25. Orlando, FL: Academic. 
Self-Direction Universalism 
Benevolence 
Conformity Tradition 
Security 
Power 
Achievement 
Hedonism 
Stimulation 
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The pattern of values implies two orthogonal higher-order dimensions: 
self-enhancement versus self-transcendence and openness to change versus 
conservatism. The former opposes values that emphasize the pursuit of one’s 
relative success and dominance over others (power and achievement) to those that 
stress acceptance of others as equals and concern for their welfare (universalism 
and benevolence). The latter contrasts values that emphasize one’s own 
independent thought and action favoring change with those that stress submissive 
self-restriction, preservation of traditional practices and protection of stability.  
 
In conclusion, Schwartz’s (1992; 1994) theoretical framework has four 
important facets: 
1) The value contents are classified according to motivational goals.  
2) The motivational goals result from the three universal requirements of 
all individuals and societies. 
3) There are congruent and competing relationships among values. These 
relationships are portrayed in a circular structure (a motivational 
continuum). 
4) The motivational continuum stimulates hypothesizing about the 
relationship of values to other variables in an integrated manner.  
 
 
2.2.3. The Schwartz Value Survey 
 
Schwartz (1992, 1994) empirically assessed his theory by conceptualizing the 
values offered by Rokeach and by building on his methodology. The revised 
version of the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) includes 57 items and asks 
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respondents to rate the importance of each value item “as a guiding principle in 
my life” on a nine-point scale (Schwartz, 1994). The analysis of the scale is 
performed by using Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) (Borg and Shye, 1995; 
Guttman, 1968). SSA is a multidimensional scaling technique that gives two-
dimensional spatial representations of the correlations among variables. The 
match between the observed and the theorized content and structure of value types 
are assessed by examining the correlations on the map. The Schwartz Value 
Theory was empirically assessed among 210 samples from 67 countries located 
on every inhabited continent. The total number of respondents was 64,271. The 
empirical results demonstrated a comprehensive and near universal set of values 
identified by the theory. In addition, the values theory holds, independent of the 
method of measurement (Schwartz et al., 2001). Furthermore, Schwartz and Bardi 
(2001) showed that there is a widespread consensus regarding the hierarchical 
order of values, whereas many studies reveal a great deal of variation in the value 
priorities of individuals within societies as well as groups across societies.  
 
 
2.2.4. Relationships of Values to other Variables 
 
The continuous pattern of motivational differences led researchers to examine the 
relationships of values to behavior, attitudes, and personality. For example, Bardi 
and Schwartz (2003) demonstrated that stimulation and tradition values relate 
strongly to the behaviors that express them, such as doing unconventional things 
and following traditional customs, respectively. Hedonism, power, universalism, 
and self-direction values relate moderately to the behaviors that express them, 
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such as being relaxed, choosing friends based on how much money they have, 
using environmentally friendly products, and examining the ideas behind rules 
before obeying them, respectively. Security, conformity, achievement, and 
benevolence values relate only marginally to the behaviors that express them like 
buying products that were made in the home country, obeying one’s parents, 
taking on many commitments, and agreeing easily to lend things to neighbors, 
respectively. 
 
Devos et al. (2002) studied the relationship of values to an attitudinal 
variable—trust—in various institutions. The authors claimed that the level of trust 
in these institutions correlated positively with values that stress stability, 
protection, and preservation of traditional practices and negatively with values 
that emphasize independent thought and action and favor change.  
 
Schwartz et al., (2000) investigated the relationship of values to worry, 
which is a personality variable. The authors broadly defined worry as an 
emotionally disturbing cognition that a state of an object in some domain of life 
will become discrepant from its desired state. Object domain represents micro 
worries that have the self or those with whom one identifies as their object and 
macro worries that have entities external to the self as their object. For example, 
“my getting cancer” corresponds to a micro worry, whereas “starvation in the 
world” stands for a macro worry. Furthermore, domain of life represents safety, 
environment, social relationships, meaning in life, achievement in work and 
studies, and economics. 
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The authors proposed that worries should be a function of values, because 
values define the desired states a person pursues, and worries entail perceived 
discrepancies from these desired states. Accordingly, relationships of people’s 
value priorities to their micro and macro worries for seven life domains were 
investigated in seven samples from four cultural groups.  
 
The results demonstrated that self-enhancement versus self-transcendence 
value dimensions are able to predict worries. The underlying argument for this 
finding is that the greater the importance a person attributes to a value, the more 
consequential it is to her to attain the goals to which the value is directed, and 
therefore, the more she will worry about any perceived threat to these valued 
goals.  
 
Because Schwartz Value Theory (1992; 1994) was empirically assessed so 
thoroughly there is no problem regarding the operationalization of the theory. 
Furthermore, several studies examined the relationships of value types to other 
variables.  However, to the best of my knowledge, no other study assessed the 
associations of individual values to risk perception consisting of emotional and 
cognitive components. 
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CHAPTER 3  
 
 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
The theoretical link between values and risk perception of terror attacks is 
postulated before presenting the research hypotheses regarding the associations of 
values with risk perception of terror attacks. 
 
 Values in the form of conscious goals are responses to three universal 
requirements with which all individuals and societies must cope: needs of 
individuals as biological organisms, requisites of coordinated social interaction 
and requirements for the smooth functioning and survival of groups. Attaining the 
goals to which the values are directed is crucial to satisfy these requirements 
(Schwartz, 1994).  
 
The risk of being exposed to a terror attack and that of a terror attack that 
may occur in the country may be perceived as threats to the fulfillment of these 
three requirements. For example, the personal threat “being exposed to a terror 
attack” may prevent an individual from getting enough pleasure from life, which 
is a threat to her own needs. Preserving her position at work may be impossible, 
which is a threat to the functioning of the society. She may not restraint her 
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actions or inclinations not to upset others because of the negative mental effects 
caused by the risk of being exposed to a terror attack, which is a threat to the 
interaction between her and the society. As a result, she may feel that there is a 
possibility of failure to attain her goals, to which the values are directed. 
Similarly, the risk of “a terror attack that may occur in the country” can be 
considered as a threat to the needs of the individuals, to the functioning of the 
society and to the social interaction. Consequently, individual values may exhibit 
relationships with risk perception of terror attacks. 
 
In the following parts, the hypotheses regarding the associations of values 
with risk perception about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror 
attack that may occur in the country are postulated. The first three sections 
provide the hypotheses regarding the relationship between values and negative 
affect, perceived likelihood, and perceived severity. The last section summarizes 
these compatible and conflicting relationships between values and risk perception.  
 
 
 
3.1. The Relationship between Values and Negative Affect  
 
Appraisal theories of emotion suggest that emotions are elicited and shaped by 
people’s subjective evaluation of an antecedent or event (Scherer, 1997). This 
explanation may explain why the same event can provoke different emotions in 
different people. Given the subjective nature of the evaluation of an event or 
situation, one might expect value-driven differences in the process of emotion 
appraisal.  
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Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) examined the relationships of individual values 
to positive affect in six samples from three cultures. Although some systematic 
correlations were found, all ranged from moderate to low. The authors claimed 
that causal relations of values with positive affect are likely to depend on whether 
people’s value priorities are congruent with situational opportunities to pursue and 
attain valued goals.  
 
Takeuchi and Lau (2001) examined the influences of value orientations 
and affective responding on help-seeking behavior problems among Chinese-
American parents. In their context, help-seeking behavior is defined as the 
likelihood that parents will choose to refer their children for professional mental 
health-care to solve certain types of problems. The authors found an indirect effect 
of value orientations on help-seeking intentions through its influence on affective 
responding. Those parents who had more traditional Chinese values responded 
with more feelings of shame to child behavior problems and, in turn, reported 
lower intentions to seek help. Thus, the value orientation has a significant effect 
on affect, in particular the feeling of shame. In congruence to this finding, shame, 
guilt and pride were found to be differently perceived across cultures (Eid and 
Diener, 2001). 
 
Scherer (1997) conducted a cross-cultural study of 37 countries from six 
geopolitically different regions to investigate the role of culture in emotion-
antecedent appraisal. This study, which included seven emotions and seven 
appraisals, examined whether similar appraisal profiles lead to similar emotions 
across cultures. Administered emotions were joy, anger fear, sadness, disgust, 
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shame and guilt; whereas the appraisals were novelty/expectation, intrinsic 
pleasantness, goal conduciveness, fairness, coping potential, control/power, and 
norms and self-ideal. The findings of this study indicated a high convergence of 
all appraisal profiles across geopolitical regions except for immorality, unfairness 
and external causation by African respondents. Shame and guilt were found to be 
the most culturally affected emotions. Furthermore, cross-cultural differences in 
unfairness affected sadness. Scherer (1997) suggested that unfairness is likely to 
affect other emotions. In support to this view, Mikula et al., (1998) found that 
anger was affected by the cross-cultural differences in unfairness.  
 
In another study, several alternative appraisal theories were compared and 
tested to approach a more accurate, complete and integrative theory of the causes 
of emotions (Roseman et al., 1996). It was claimed that cognitive appraisals can 
have causal impact on emotions.  
 
Heine and Lehman (1995) explained the concept of independent self as 
feeling oneself sufficient and worthy. Schwartz et al (1994) stated that self-
direction derives from organismic needs for control and mastery. Therefore, it 
may be postulated that attributing more importance to self-direction values may 
cause a person to believe that she has sufficient control to prevent herself from a 
personal threat. Regarding these arguments, it may be predicted that self-direction 
values impede emotional responses. The more priority people attribute to these 
values, the less emotional they feel about the threat of being exposed to a terror 
attack. Although the literature findings point out a relationship between values 
 28  
 
and emotions, this association was not clear to postulate any other specific 
hypotheses.  
 
 
 
3.2. The Relationship between Values and Perceived Likelihood 
 
Heine and Lehman (1995) found differences between the Japanese and Canadian 
respondents’ perceived vulnerabilities, when the participants were asked to make 
risk judgments on negative future life events such as becoming an alcoholic, 
having a nervous breakdown and getting AIDS. The findings of this study 
demonstrated that Canadian participants were more optimistically biased than the 
Japanese respondents. Compared to their Japanese counterparts, Canadians 
perceived themselves as less vulnerable than others to negative future life events. 
The lower perceived vulnerability among Canadians was explained by referring to 
the concept of independent self. The independent self of a person is motivated to 
maintain the autonomy of her inviolable self, thereby confirming that she is a self-
sufficient and worthy person. Therefore, the more a person perceives herself 
sufficient and worthy, the more invulnerable she feels about threats, and hence the 
more optimistic bias she exhibits. Although these findings provided some 
evidence of a relationship between values and perceived likelihood, there are 
many methodological shortcomings in the study. For example, the design of the 
questionnaires and the significant gender differences between the two samples 
that might have affected participants’ likelihood judgments.  
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Sagiv and Schwartz (2000) claimed that conformity, tradition and security 
values are classified as representing deficiency needs. An emphasis on these 
values expresses the desire to compensate for deprivation. Giving priority to these 
values is therefore more likely among people who feel unsafe, lacking in control 
over their lives, and threatened in their relationships with others.  
 
These arguments may suggest a negative relationship between self-
direction, and stimulation values and perceived likelihood of being exposed to a 
terror attack. These two value types derive from organismic needs for control, 
mastery, and stimulation. They have an emphasis on one’s own independent 
thought and action and favoring change (Schwartz, 1994).  Therefore, identifying 
with one’s independent self may cause people to feel less vulnerable to threats. 
Conversely, the more importance attributed to tradition, conformity and security 
values, the more attention is paid to feeling unsafe and lacking control over one’s 
life. This perception may lead people to perceive being exposed to a terror attack 
more likely.  
 
Tradition, conformity and security values emphasize devotion to one’s in-
group on contrary to the self-direction and stimulation value types that emphasize 
large distance between the self and others. Regarding a terror attack that may 
occur in the country, tradition, conformity and security value types may correlate 
positively with the perceived likelihood of this risk. Therefore, people giving 
priority to these values may perceive the risk for their country more likely. 
Stimulation value type may exhibit a negative correlation with the perceived 
likelihood of the risk for the country because this value type has the goal of 
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attendant lack of interest in others (Schwartz et al., 2000). Therefore, people 
giving priority to this value type may perceive this risk less likely. In addition, the 
association of self-direction value type with perceived likelihood of this risk 
cannot be predicted.  
 
 
 
3.3. The Relationship between Values and Perceived Severity  
 
Schwartz et al (2000) investigated the relationships of people’s value priorities to 
their micro (e.g., getting cancer or being a victim of a traffic accident) and macro 
worries (e.g., people in the world dying of hunger or the outbreak of a nuclear 
war) in seven samples from four cultural groups. The results of the study showed 
that the more important power values are the more attention is paid to threats to 
self-interests. Thus, the more frequent and intense are the cognitive awareness and 
affective experience of micro worry associated with such threats because power 
values are the most self-centered of the self-enhancement values.  
 
It may be postulated that the more importance a person attributes to power 
values, the more severe she perceives the consequences of the threat of being 
exposed to a terror attack because she feels that she cannot attain her goals to 
which these values are directed. Hypotheses regarding the relationship of 
achievement and security values to perceived severity are not postulated because 
self interest is not the main emphasis of these two values. Similar to power values, 
achievement values express self-interest, but in the service of meeting social 
standards and gaining social approval (Schwartz, 1992). Hence, achievement 
 31  
 
values include both self interest and interest in others. Hedonism values express 
self interest besides sharing elements of favoring change and sensuous 
gratification for oneself.   
 
Universalism and benevolence values emphasize concern for the welfare 
of all and for the nature rather than self-interested outcomes (Schwartz, 2005). 
Giving priority to these two values may promote the pursuit of other enhancing 
goals, which, in turn, results in the development of perceived severity about a 
threat to one’s country. Conversely these values may inhibit the development of 
the perceived severity about a threat to oneself. 
 
It may be postulated that the greater priority a person attributes to 
universalism and benevolence values, the more severe she perceives the 
consequences of a terror attack that may occur in her country because others 
cannot attain their goals to which these values are directed. Furthermore, 
universalism and benevolence value types may have a negative relationship with 
the perceived severity of being exposed to a terror attack because these values 
may inhibit the development of perceived severity, when the threat is to oneself.   
 
Stimulation and self-direction versus the conformity and tradition value 
types might have any pattern of associations with being exposed to a terror attack 
versus a terror attack that may occur in the country. Therefore, the hypotheses 
regarding the associations of these value types to perceived severity are not 
postulated. However, it is postulated that security values exhibit a positive 
relationship with the perceived severity of a terror attack. Perceived severity about 
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the consequences of a terror attack relates to loss of control over personal and 
national outcomes that assure security and certainty. Security values express the 
importance people place on personal security, national security, certainty and 
structure in order to avert physical, psychological ambiguity, danger and risk 
(Bilsky and Schwartz, 1994). Thus, the more importance attributed to security 
values, the more attention is paid to the perceived severity about being exposed to 
a terror attack and about a terror attack that may occur in the country. 
 
 
 
3.4. The Compatible and Conflicting Relationships between 
Values and Risk Perception 
 
Table 2 lists all the proposed relationships between values and risk perception that 
were presented in the previous sections. Compatible values have positive 
relationships with perceived likelihood, severity and negative affect, whereas 
conflicting values have negative relationships with these components of risk 
perception. 
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Table 2. Proposed Compatibility and Conflict of Value Emphases with Risk 
Perception 
 
 Value emphases on being 
exposed to a terror attack 
Value emphases on a terror 
attack in the country 
Risk Perception Compatible  Conflicting  Compatible  Conflicting  
Negative Affect ___ Self-direction ___ ___ 
Likelihood Tradition 
Conformity 
Security 
Self-direction 
Stimulation 
Tradition 
Conformity 
Security 
Stimulation 
Severity Power 
Security 
 
Universalism 
Benevolence 
Universalism 
Benevolence 
Security 
___ 
 
Table 2 indicates that the greater the importance is attributed to compatible 
values, the higher the risk perception is expressed. Conversely, the greater the 
priority is given to conflicting values, the lower the risk perception is exhibited. 
Accordingly, the research hypotheses are listed as follows: 
H1: Self-direction values correlate negatively with negative affect about 
being exposed to a terror attack. 
H2:  Tradition, conformity, and security values correlate positively with 
perceived likelihood of being exposed to a terror attack, whereas 
stimulation and self-direction values correlate negatively with perceived 
likelihood of this risk. 
H3:  Tradition, conformity and security values correlate positively with 
perceived likelihood of a terror attack that may occur in the country, 
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whereas stimulation values correlate negatively with perceived likelihood 
of this risk. 
H4: Power and security values correlate positively with perceived severity 
of being exposed to a terror attack, whereas universalism and benevolence 
values correlate negatively with perceived severity of this risk. 
H5: Universalism, benevolence and security values correlate positively 
with perceived severity of a terror attack that may occur in the country. 
  
The first research hypothesis postulates that the more importance people 
attribute to self-direction values, the less emotional they feel about being exposed 
to a terror attack. The second research hypothesis predicts that the greater priority 
people attribute to tradition, conformity, and security values, the more likely they 
perceive being exposed to a terror attack. However, the more priority they 
attribute to stimulation and self-direction values, the less likely they perceive this 
risk. The third research hypothesis postulates that the more importance people 
give to tradition, conformity and security values, the more likely they perceive the 
risk of a terror attack that may occur in their country. However, the greater 
priority they attribute to stimulation values, the less likely they perceive this risk. 
The fourth research hypothesis posits that the more importance people attribute to 
power and security values, the more severe they perceive the risk of being 
exposed to a terror attack. Conversely, the greater priority they attribute to 
universalism, and benevolence values, the less severe they perceive this risk. The 
last research hypothesis predicts that the more importance people attribute to 
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universalism, benevolence, and security values, the more severe they perceive the 
risk of a terror attack that may occur in their country.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
4.1. Participants 
 
A total of 650 students at Bilkent University (Turkey) and Hacettepe University 
(Turkey) and 317 students at Tel Aviv University (Israel) volunteered to 
participate in the study. The surveys were conducted at Bilkent and Hacettepe 
universities between October 2006 and January 2006 and at Tel Aviv University 
between March 2007 and June 2007. A total of 114 Turkish students and 19 
Israeli students were dropped before the analysis in compliance with the 
elimination criteria of Schwartz (2005a). As a result, the final sample consisted 
of 536 Turkish and 298 Israeli students.  
 
The Turkish sample composed of 480 social sciences and 56 natural 
sciences and engineering students; the Israeli sample composed of 226 social 
sciences, and 72 natural sciences and engineering students. The Turkish sample 
consisted of 195 male and 341 female respondents, aged 17-35 years (M = 
20.74, SD = 2.90); the Israeli sample consisted of 105 male and 193 female 
respondents, aged 17-40 years (M = 24.73, SD = 3.48). 
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4.2. Instruments 
 
Two instruments were used in the current research. The Schwartz (1994) Value 
Survey (SVS) was administered to measure the importance ratings of specific 
values representative of ten universal value types. The Terror Attack Risk 
Perception Survey (TRPS) was administered to measure the emotional and 
cognitive perceptions of terror attacks.  
 
 
4.2.1. The Schwartz Value Survey  
 
The participants completed the 57-item SVS. They rated the importance of each 
value item (e.g., equality, respect for tradition, successful and curious) “as a 
guiding principle in my life” on a nine-point scale ranging from –1 (opposed to 
my principles) to 0 (not important) to 3 (important) to 7 (of supreme 
importance). The SVS presents value items in two sections. The first contains 30 
items that describe potentially desirable end-states in a noun form (e.g., respect 
for tradition, wealth or freedom). The second includes 27 items that describe 
potentially desirable ways of acting in an adjective form (e.g., moderate, daring 
or protecting environment). Items that index different values are intermixed 
throughout the SVS. Prior to rating the items on each list, respondents were 
asked to read the whole list, to choose and rate the value item most important to 
them, and then to choose and rate the item least important to them.  
 
Schwartz (2005a) suggests that respondents are dropped before analyses, 
if they use response “7” more than 21 times or any other response more than 35 
times, because those who concentrate their responses to such a degree have 
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probably not made a serious effort to differentiate among their values. In 
addition, those who respond to fewer than 41 values are excluded. The same 
procedure was applied before the analyses of the present study. Accordingly, 
17.54 % of the Turkish respondents (n = 114) and 5.99 % of the Israeli 
participants (n = 19) were dropped before the analyses. 
 
Furthermore, Schwartz (2005a) suggests using only 46 out of 57 value 
items because these 46 items emerged in their postulated region in at least 75% 
of 210 samples, in this or adjacent regions in at least 95% of the samples and in 
this region in at least 55% of the samples. Accordingly, 46 value items were used 
in the current research. The importance score for each value index is the mean of 
the ratings of the items that index it. The value items that index each of the ten 
values are listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Value items that index each of the ten values 
 
Power: Social power, wealth, authority, preserving public image 
 
Achievement: Ambitious, influential, capable, successful 
 
Hedonism: Pleasure, enjoying life, self indulgent 
 
Stimulation: Exciting life, varied life, daring 
 
Self-direction: Freedom, creativity, independent, choosing own goals, curious 
 
Universalism: Equality, world at peace, unity with nature, wisdom, world of 
beauty, social justice, broadminded, protecting environment 
 
Benevolence: Loyal, honest, helpful, responsible, forgiving 
 
Conformity: Politeness, self discipline, honoring parents and elders, obedient 
 
Tradition: Respect for tradition, moderate, humble, accepting my portion in life, 
devout 
 
Security: Social order, national security, reciprocation of favors, family security, 
clean 
 
 
Individuals and cultural groups differ in their use of the response scale 
(Schwartz et al, 1997; Smith, 2004). Therefore, scale use correction was applied 
for the 46-item SVS when treating value indexes as either independent or 
dependent variables. Accordingly, each individual’s total score on all value items 
was divided by the total number of items. This mean score was used as a 
covariate to control for individual differences in the use of the response scale. 
 
 
4.2.2. Risk Perception Survey on Terror Attacks 
 
In the risk perception survey, variables that were thought to have potential 
impact on terror risk perception were measured. The survey began with an 
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introductory paragraph that provided brief information on terror attacks. 
Following the introductory paragraph, a section on demographics and 
background data was included. The risk perception scales about terror attacks 
were presented next. 
 
Demographic and background data: Age, gender and university major 
were recorded. The individual’s or a relatives’ direct involvement in a terror 
attack was reported, and respondents were asked about their perceived 
knowledge about terror attacks in their own country and in other countries (1 = 
no information at all, 2 = some information, and 3 = a lot of information).  
 
There were significant differences between the two groups with respect 
to age (t = 16.82, p < 0.001) and experience with terror attacks (χ2 = 26.08, p < 
0.001). Israeli participants were significantly older and reported more experience 
with terror attacks than their Turkish counterparts. There were no significant 
differences between the two samples regarding gender (χ2 = .01, p = 0.74) and 
perceived knowledge of terror attacks that occur in the country and in other 
countries (t = 1.83, p = 0.07 and t = 0.71, p = 0.48, respectively). These 
differences were considered in data analyses. 
 
Risk perception of terror attacks: The risk perception parts of the survey 
aimed to measure cognitive and emotional perceptions and consisted of three 
sections. The first section included emotional items, whereas the second and 
third sections included cognitive ones. 
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Emotional perceptions were measured by asking respondents about the 
intensity of their feelings about being exposed to a terror attack. In addition, 
respondents were asked about their intensity of feelings about terror attacks that 
may occur in their country within a year. Accordingly, emotional perceptions 
were recorded at both individual and national levels. The emotion items were 
fear, helplessness, anger, distress, insecurity, hopelessness, sadness and anxiety. 
The participants reported the intensity of their feelings on a 7-point scale (1 = “I 
do not feel at all”, and 7 = “I strongly feel”).   
 
Cognitive perceptions were measured by asking respondents about their 
perceived probability and severity regarding terror attacks, and their perceived 
likelihood about possible consequences of terror attacks. The participants 
reported their perceived probabilities by using likelihood and probability in 
percentages scales. In the 7-point likelihood scale (1 = extremely unlikely, and 7 
= extremely likely), respondents indicated how likely they thought they would 
be exposed to a terror attack within a year. In the probability in percentages 
scale, they expressed a percentage between 0% and 100% (0% indicates 
“impossible to happen”, and 100% indicates “certain to happen”). In addition, 
they reported their perceived likelihood and probability in percentages about a 
terror attack that may occur in their country within a year.  
 
Perceived severity was measured by asking about the severity of 
consequences about being exposed to a terror attack within a year. Respondents 
indicated their perceptions on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (“not serious at 
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all”) to 7 (“extremely serious”). They followed a similar scale for the severity of 
a terror attack that may occur in their country within a year. 
Lastly, respondents indicated their perceived likelihood of possible 
consequences of a terror attack. They reported their perceptions both for 
themselves and for their country on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (“extremely 
unlikely”) to 7 (“extremely likely”). The consequences section in the terror risk 
perception survey included 16 items like “I would face psychological problems, 
if exposed to a terror attack” and “there might be public panic in our country, if a 
terror attack occurred.” The former item represents a consequence for oneself, 
whereas the latter represents a consequence for one’s country. Of the 16 items 
regarding consequences of a terror attack that may occur within a year, eight 
were taken from the Terror Risk Perception Questionnaire (TRPQ) developed by 
Shiloh et al (2007). These items represent the consequences for oneself. The 
remaining eight items were generated by 20 Business Administration students at 
Bilkent University in June 2006. These items represent consequences for one’s 
country. The survey excluding this last section was entitled as Terror Risk 
Perception Survey (TRPS). Whenever the term “TRPS” is used in this 
dissertation, it indicates the survey including the beforementioned parts of the 
survey except for the likelihood of consequences section. 
 
 
 
4.3. Procedure 
 
Survey participants were recruited from Bilkent and Hacettepe universities in 
Turkey and from Tel Aviv University in Israel in response to announcements 
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inviting students to participate in a 20-minute survey about values and risk 
perception. The surveys were conducted on a volunteer basis. Oral debriefing 
that explained the purpose of the study and the names and contact details of the 
researchers were given to the volunteered Turkish participants, before taking the 
surveys. A similar debriefing was given to the volunteered Israeli participants, in 
a written format. The risk perception survey was initially constructed in Turkish 
and translated into English and Hebrew. Translations were checked by backward 
procedures using people fluent in the relevant languages. The participants filled 
out the SVS and risk perception survey in their native language, which took 
about 20 minutes. 
  44 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
The findings are presented in three sections. The first section includes the results 
regarding values where the findings about values of the Turkish and Israeli 
samples are provided and compared. The second section introduces the findings 
regarding risk perception of terror attacks. In this section, risk perception 
findings from the Turkish and Israeli participants are demonstrated and 
compared. The third section presents the relationship between values and risk 
perception for the Turkish and Israeli samples.  
 
 
 
5.1. Values  
 
Results regarding values begin with findings from the Turkish sample, continue 
with findings from the Israeli sample, and end with a comparison between the 
two groups. 
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5.1.1. Values of the Turkish Participants 
 
The total pattern of relations among Turkish individuals’ values was assessed to 
examine its correspondence with the theoretical structure presented in Figure 1. 
Accordingly, a matrix of Pearson correlations between the 46 value items was 
prepared. Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) (Borg and Shye, 1995; Guttman, 
1968) was applied to the correlation matrix in order to map items as points in a 
multi-dimensional space such that the distances between the points reflect the 
interrelations among the items. The coefficient of alienation was computed as 
0.19. This coefficient is a measure of goodness-of-fit between the obtained 
solution and the original data. The coefficient ranges between 0 and 1, with zero 
indicating perfect fit of the geometrical representation to the input similarity data. 
A value of 0.20 or less indicates a good fit (Ben-Shalom and Horenczyk, 2003). 
Thus, the coefficient computed in this study can be considered adequate. The SSA 
provided a two-dimensional spatial map of relations among values without partition 
lines.  
 
Schwartz (2005a) suggested three criteria to partition the space into 
distinct regions containing the items that represent each of the values in the 
Schwartz Values Theory. Those criteria are as follows: 
1) A bounded region must include the following attributes: (a) at least 
60% of the items must be postulated a priori to index that value; (b) at 
least 70% of all items in the region must have been judged a priori as 
potentially reflecting the goals of the appropriate value as one of their 
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meanings; and (c) the region must include no more than 33% of the 
items postulated to index any other value.   
2) If the above criteria are not met, it must be assessed whether two 
different values are intermixed in a joint region, using the following 
criteria: (a) the region contains at least 50% of the items that index each 
value and (b) at least 70% of the items in the region potentially reflect 
the goals of these two values.  
3) If neither set of criteria is met, one can conclude that the value is not 
discriminated in the sample. 
 
Accordingly, the space of the SSA map in the current research was 
partitioned in accordance with the above criteria of Schwartz (2005a). Figure 2 
presents the partitioned   SSA map for the Turkish sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 2. SSA map of the observed relations among values in the Turkish sample (n = 536, coefficient alienation = .19)
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Figure 2 shows that bounded regions of tradition, universalism, self-
direction and achievement values included 100% of the items postulated a priori 
to index those values. The security value type included 80% of the items, and the 
power value type included 75 % of them. “Preserving public image,” which was 
postulated a priori as a power item appeared in security.  Similarly, “reciprocation 
of favors” postulated a priori as a security item, appeared in the combined values 
of benevolence and conformity values. The first criterion of Schwartz (2005a) was 
satisfied for tradition, universalism, self-direction, achievement, security and 
power value types. Power values appeared behind achievement values, in addition 
to tradition values that appeared behind benevolence & conformity and security 
values. Stimulation, hedonism, conformity, and benevolence values were in 
compliance with the second criterion of Schwartz. Stimulation values formed a 
joint region with hedonism values, whereas conformity values mixed together 
with benevolence values. In addition, “obedient”, which was postulated as a 
conformity item, belonged to tradition values. As a result, the organization of 
specific items and basic values is similar but not identical to the theoretical 
prototype.  
 
After identifying the organization of specific items and basic values, mean 
ratings, standard deviations, ranks and reliabilities of values were calculated. 
Table 4 presents the means, standard deviations, ranks and Cronbach coefficients 
of reliabilities for the value types. 
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Table 4. Mean ratings, standard deviations, ranks and reliabilities of values in the 
Turkish sample (n = 536). 
 
  
Mean Rating 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Rank 
 
Reliability 
Power 3.65 
 
1.60 7 0.76 
Achievement 4.47 
 
1.19 5 0.71 
Hedonism & 
Stimulation 
4.14 
 
1.13 6 0.73 
Self-direction 5.27 
 
0.85 1 0.61 
Universalism 4.74 
 
1.00 4 0.80 
Benevolence & 
Conformity 
4.98 
 
0.87 3 0.76 
Tradition 3.33 
 
1.25 8 0.72 
Security 5.01 
 
1.00 2 0.63 
 
Table 4 demonstrates that self-direction, security and benevolence values 
were among the three most highly rated value types, whereas hedonism & 
stimulation, power and tradition were among the three lowest-rated value types. 
Given the generally accepted benchmarks around 0.70 (McIntire and Miller, 
2000), measurements of all values except self-direction and security can be 
considered reliable. However, even the reliabilities of these values were within the 
ranges commonly observed for these specific values (Schwartz et al., 2000; 
Schmitt et al., 1993).  
 
The demographic differences in mean ratings of values were assessed by 
MANOVA. The mean of all value items was used as a covariate to control for 
individual differences in using the response scale. No significant age differences 
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in value scores were found. However, significant gender differences were 
obtained in all values except for self-direction and security. Table 5 presents 
gender differences in mean ratings of value scores in the Turkish sample. 
 
Table 5.  Gender differences in mean ratings of value scores in the Turkish sample. 
 
 Male  
(n = 195) 
Female  
(n = 341) 
F-statistic p-value 
Power 4.03 
 
3.42 24.89 .000 
Achievement 4.60 
 
4.40 7.38 .007 
Hedonism &  
Stimulation 
4.28 
 
4.06 7.55 .006 
Self-direction 5.18 
 
5.31 3.04 .082 
Universalism 4.60 
 
4.82 7.52 .006 
Benevolence & 
Conformity 
4.90 
 
5.03 4.21 .041 
Tradition 3.46 
 
3.26 7.11 .008 
Security 5.01 
 
5.02 0.20 .653 
 
Table 5 demonstrates that the Turkish male respondents attributed greater 
priority to power, achievement, hedonism & stimulation and tradition values 
compared to their female counterparts. However, they gave less importance to 
universalism and benevolence & conformity values than the female respondents. 
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5.1.2. Values of the Israeli Participants 
 
A matrix of Pearson correlations between the 46 value items was prepared. 
Similarity Structure Analysis (SSA) (Borg and Shye, 1995; Guttman, 1968) 
applied to the correlation matrix resulted in a coefficient of alienation of 0.28. The 
criteria of (2005a) were used to partition the space into distinct regions that 
contained the items representing each of the values in the Schwartz Values 
Theory. Figure 3 presents the partitioned SSA map for the Israeli sample.  
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Figure 3 shows that the bounded regions of the universalism and self-
direction values included 100% of the items postulated a priori to index those 
values, whereas the security value type included 80% of the items. “Reciprocation 
of favors”, which was postulated a priori as a security item appeared in 
benevolence & conformity. Tradition values included 67% of the items postulated 
a priori to index that value and 30 % of the items postulated to index conformity 
values. “Self-discipline” and “Obedient”, which were postulated a priori as 
conformity items appeared in tradition.  In addition, “Humble”, which was 
postulated a priori as tradition item appeared in benevolence & conformity. 
Accordingly, the first criterion of Schwartz (2005a) was satisfied for the 
universalism, self-direction, security and tradition value types. Tradition values 
appeared behind security and benevolence & conformity values.  
 
Stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, benevolence and conformity 
values were in compliance with the second criterion of Schwartz. Stimulation with 
hedonism values, power with achievement values and benevolence with 
conformity values formed joint regions. Hedonism & stimulation values contained 
100% of the items that indexed each value and 86% of the items in the region 
potentially reflected the goals of these two values. “Influential,” which was 
postulated a priori as achievement item appeared in hedonism & stimulation. 
Power & achievement contained 100% of the items that indexed power values and 
75% of the items that indexed achievement values. Of the items in the region, 
100% potentially reflected the goals of these two values. Benevolence & 
conformity values included 50% of the items that indexed benevolence values and 
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100 % of the items that indexed conformity. Of the items in the region, 78% 
potentially reflected the goals of these values. As a result, the organization of 
specific items and basic values is similar to the theoretical prototype, although not 
identical.  
 
After identifying the organization of specific items and basic values, mean 
ratings, standard deviations, ranks, and reliabilities of values were calculated. 
Table 6 provides the means, standard deviations, ranks, and Cronbach coefficients 
of reliabilities for the value types. 
 
Table 6. Mean ratings, standard deviations, ranks and reliabilities of values in the 
Israeli sample (n = 298) 
 
  
Mean Rating 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Rank 
 
Reliability 
Power &  
Achievement 
3.71 
 
1.00 6 0.74 
Hedonism & 
Stimulation 
3.95 
 
1.01 5 0.77 
Self-direction 5.06 
 
0.87 1 0.62 
Universalism 4.32 
 
0.88 4 0.70 
Benevolence & 
Conformity 
4.57 
 
0.90 2 0.79 
Tradition 2.91 
 
1.16 7 0.68 
Security 4.43 
 
1.04 3 0.58 
 
Table 6 indicates that self-direction, benevolence & conformity and 
security values were among the three most highly rated value types, whereas 
hedonism & stimulation, power & achievement and tradition were among the 
three most lowly rated value types. Measurements of all values except self-
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direction, tradition and security can be considered reliable because they are within 
the range of the generally accepted benchmark of 0.70 (McIntire and Miller, 
2000). However, even the reliabilities of self-direction, tradition, and security 
were within the ranges commonly observed for these values (Schwartz et al., 
2000; Schmitt et al., 1993).  
 
The demographic differences in mean ratings of values were assessed by 
MANOVA. The mean of all value items was used as a covariate to control for 
individual differences in using the response scale. No significant age differences 
in value scores were found. However, significant gender differences were 
obtained in self-direction and tradition values. Table 7 presents gender differences 
in mean ratings of value scores in the Israeli sample. 
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Table 7.  Gender differences in mean ratings of value scores in the Israeli sample. 
 
 Male  
(n = 195) 
Female  
(n = 341) 
F-statistic p-value 
Power &  
Achievement 
3.69 
 
3.72 2.64 .105 
Hedonism &  
Stimulation 
3.86 
 
4.00 .05 .825 
Self-direction 5.11 
 
5.03 5.77 .017 
Universalism 4.20 
 
4.38 .21 .649 
Benevolence &  
Conformity 
4.43 
 
4.65 .46 .499 
Tradition 2.97 
 
2.87 9.06 .003 
Security 4.31 
 
4.49 0.01 .968 
 
Table 7 demonstrates that the Israeli male respondents attributed 
significantly more importance to self-direction and tradition values compared to 
their female counterparts. 
 
5.1.3. Comparison of the Turkish and Israeli Samples on Values 
 
The structural examination of the SSA maps of the two samples indicate that the 
first criterion of Schwartz (2005a) was satisfied for the values of tradition, 
universalism, self-direction, achievement, security, and power in the Turkish 
sample whereas this criterion was satisfied for the values of tradition, 
universalism, self-direction, and in the Israeli sample. Accordingly, the bounded 
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regions included 100% of the items postulated a priori to index those values. In 
the Turkish sample power values appeared behind achievement values. In both 
samples, tradition values appeared behind benevolence & conformity and security 
values.  
 
The second criterion of Schwartz (2005a) was satisfied for stimulation, 
hedonism, conformity and benevolence values of the Turkish sample, whereas this 
criterion was satisfied for stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, 
benevolence and conformity values of the Israeli sample. Accordingly, stimulation 
values with hedonism values and conformity values with benevolence values 
formed joint regions in both samples. Additionally, power values mixed together 
with achievement values in the Israeli sample. 
 
As a result, the organization of specific items and basic values in both 
samples is similar to the theoretical prototype but not identical. The analysis 
yielded eight basic values for the Turkish sample and seven values for the Israeli 
sample, although the theoretical prototype contained ten basic values.  
 
When the ranks of values for the two samples were compared, self-
direction, security and benevolence & conformity were among the three most 
highly rated value types in both samples with self-direction being the most highly 
rated. Security was the second most highly rated value type in the Turkish sample 
and the third in the Israeli sample. Benevolence & conformity was the third in the 
Turkish sample, although it was the second in the Israeli sample. The most lowly 
rated value type was tradition in both samples. 
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When the reliabilities of values for the two samples were compared, 
measurements of self-direction and security values were below 0.70, which is the 
generally accepted benchmark for reliability. However, these reliabilities were 
within the ranges commonly observed for these values (Schwartz et al., 2000; 
Schmitt et al., 1993).  
 
In both samples, significant gender differences but no significant age 
differences in value scores were found. In the Turkish sample, significant gender 
differences in power, achievement, hedonism & stimulation, universalism, 
benevolence & conformity and tradition values were obtained whereas in the 
Israeli sample significant gender differences in self-direction and tradition values 
were found. In both samples, males attributed greater priority to tradition values 
compared to their female counterparts. 
 
 
 
5.3. Risk Perception of Terror Attacks  
 
Results regarding terror risk perception begin with the findings from the Turkish 
sample, continue with those from the Israeli sample, and end with a comparison 
between the two groups. 
 
 
5.3.1. Risk Perceptions of Terror Attacks in the Turkish Sample 
 
Internal structure of the affect scales: The first affect scale in the TRPS aims to 
measure the intensity of negative feelings about being exposed to a terror attack, 
whereas the second aims to measure the intensity of negative feelings about a 
  59 
terror attack that may occur in the country. The reliabilities of these two scales 
were found as 0.90 and 0.89, respectively. The item-total correlations of the two 
affect scales ranged from 0.66 to 0.78 and 0.48 and 0.74, respectively. The 
measurement of each of the affect scales can be considered reliable, because tests 
with reliabilities above 0.70 are considered adequate (McIntire and Miller, 2000). 
Furthermore, item-total correlations of the affect scales demonstrated adequate 
item effectivity because correlations were above 0.21 (Aiken, 1994). 
 
The overall mean ratings and standard deviations of each of the affect 
scales were computed. In addition, the items of perceived likelihood and 
probability were combined as a single item. The difference in mean ratings 
between being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur in the 
country were assessed by repeated measures MANOVA. The demographic and 
background variables; gender, and perceived knowledge of terror attacks in the 
country were controlled during the analysis. Main effect for threat, F(3, 530) = 
11.06, p < .001, reached significance. Table 8 presents the results of univariate F 
tests for negative affect, perceived likelihood and perceived severity for each 
threat (being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur in the 
country).  
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Table 8. Mean ratings and standard deviations (in parentheses) of negative affect 
scales, perceived likelihood and severity items, and univariate Fs for being exposed 
to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur in Turkey (n = 536). 
 
 Being 
exposed to a 
terror attack 
 
A terror 
attack 
in Turkey 
 
F-statistic 
 
p-value 
Negative Affect 3.99 (1.40) 
 
4.66 (1.31) 2.36 .125 
Likelihood 3.15 (1.35) 
 
5.52 (1.71) 33.13 .000 
Severity 6.10 (1.17) 
 
6.04 (1.31) 0.45 .502 
 
The findings presented in Table 8 demonstrate that the Turkish participants 
perceived the risk of a terror attack that may occur in their country more likely 
than the risk of being exposed to a terror attack. No significant differences were 
found in negative affect and perceived severity ratings between the two risks. 
 
Correlations between emotions and cognitions: Pearson correlations 
between the negative affect scores and the perceived likelihood, and perceived 
severity scores about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that 
may occur in the country were computed. The demographic and background 
variables; gender, and perceived knowledge of terror attacks in the country were 
controlled during the analysis. Pearson correlations between emotions and 
cognitions about the risk of terror attacks are provided in Table 9.  
  61 
Table 9.  Pearson correlations between emotions and cognitions regarding the risk of 
terror attacks (n = 536). 
 
 Being exposed to a 
terror attack 
 
A terror attack 
in Turkey 
Cognitions r r 
Likelihood .39 
 
.27 
Severity .21 .18 
*p < .001 for all Pearson correlations 
 
The findings presented in Table 9 demonstrate that the more negative 
emotions Turkish participants expressed, the stronger they perceived the 
likelihood, and severity of being exposed to a terror attack and of a terror attack 
that may occur in their country. These correlations were significant (p < .001). 
Fisher r-to-z transformation was applied to find out significant differences 
between the correlations for being exposed to a terror attack and for a terror attack 
that may occur in the country. The analyses suggested a significant difference in 
the negative affect-perceived likelihood relationship (z = 2.20, p = .03) but not a 
significant difference in the negative affect-perceived severity (z = .51, p = .61). 
The association between Turkish respondents’ emotions and their perceived 
likelihood of being exposed to a terror attack is stronger than that of a terror attack 
that may occur in their country. 
 
Demographic and background differences in mean ratings of TRPS 
scores: Significant differences of age, experience with terror attacks and 
perceived knowledge of terror attacks (in other countries) in mean ratings of 
  62 
TRPS scores were not found. However, significant differences were obtained for 
perceived knowledge of terror attacks in Turkey. The Turkish participants who 
presented themselves as having greater knowledge of terror attacks in Turkey 
perceived the risk of a terror attack that may occur in their country more likely (M 
= 5.80, SD = 1.72) than those with less perceived knowledge (M = 5.03, SD = 
1.58, F = 18.26, p <.001). The analysis yielded significant gender differences in 
all TRPS scores, except for the perceived likelihood of a terror attack in the 
country. Gender differences in mean ratings of TRPS scores are presented in 
Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Gender differences in mean ratings of TRPS scores in the Turkish sample 
(n = 536). 
 
 Being exposed to a 
terror attack 
  
A terror attack 
in the country 
 Male 
(n=195) 
 
Female  
(n=341) 
F- 
statistic 
Male 
(n=195) 
Female 
(n=341) 
F- 
statistic 
Negative affect 3.43 
 
4.32 53.68** 4.12 4.97 57.53** 
Likelihood 2.79 
 
3.35 22.06** 5.74 5.40 0.89 
Severity 5.79 
 
6.28 22.26** 5.52 6.34 52.81** 
** p < .001 
 
Table 10 demonstrates that Turkish female respondents were more 
emotional about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that may 
occur in their country compared to their male counterparts. Similarly, they 
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perceived more severe consequences about these two risks than the male 
respondents. The females perceived the risk of being exposed to a terror attack 
more likely than the males, however no significant association was found between 
gender and perceived likelihood of a terror attack that may occur in the country. 
 
Perception of the consequences scales: Exploratory principal-components 
factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted on the 16 items of the 
consequences scale in the TRPS. Half of the items were possible consequences of 
being exposed to a terror attack, whereas the other half involved a terror attack 
that may occur in the country. Therefore, it was predicted that those two groups of 
consequences would represent two factors.  Based on Cattell’s scree test, a two 
factor solution appeared to be the best choice for the factorial structure in both 
surveys. The factor loadings and item-total correlations of the 16-item scale are 
shown in Table 11.  
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Table 11. Factor loadings and item-total correlations of the consequences scale in the 
Turkish sample (n = 536).  
 
 Factor loadings  
Item  
I 
 
II 
Item-total 
correlations 
My life wouldn’t be the same as it was 
before 
.72 
 
 .61 
My position at work would be endangered .63  .58 
I would face psychological problems .80  .68 
I would need help from close others  to 
cope with this trauma 
.73 
 
 .62 
I would very often catch myself thinking 
about my terrorist attack experience 
.76 
 
 .61 
My relationship with close others would 
be threatened 
.54 
 
 .48 
I would be physically disabled .67  .51 
My financial situation would get worse .53  .46 
Public panic in our country  .69 .59 
Decrease or pause in investments of 
foreign or local investors 
 
 
.69 .59 
Loss of trust in government institutions  .71 .60 
War against another country   .58 .48 
War in our country  .62 .53 
An earlier election in our country   .72 .59 
Decrease in the earnings of tourism  .56 .46 
Economic crisis in our country  .76 .67 
 
Table 11 demonstrates that the ranges of factor loadings were 0.53-0.80 
for being exposed to a terror attack and 0.56-0.76 for a terror attack that may 
occur in the country. Because these items having factor loadings above 0.32 are 
considered as statistically meaningful in representing a particular factor 
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996), the ranges of factor loadings presented in Table 9 
indicate that the two factors represent consequences for oneself and for one’s 
country. The ranges of item-total correlations of the consequences scales about 
being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack in the country were 0.46-0.68, 
and 0.46-0.67, respectively. Aiken (1994) proposed item total correlation above 
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0.21 as suggesting adequate item effectivity. Therefore, item-total correlations of 
the two consequences scales in TRPS demonstrate adequate item effectivity. The 
reliabilities of each of the consequences scales were found to be 0.83. Both scales 
may be considered as reliable given the generally accepted benchmark of 0.70.  
 
The difference in mean ratings between the risk of being exposed to a 
terror attack (M = 4.88, SD = 1.10) and a terror attack that may occur in the 
country (M = 5.09, SD = 1.08) were assessed by repeated measures MANOVA. 
However, no significant difference was found between these two risks in the 
“perceived likelihood of consequences” (F = .01, p = .95). 
 
 
5.3.2. Risk Perception of Terror Attacks in the Israeli Sample  
 
Internal structure of the affect scales: The item-total correlations of the affect 
scale measuring the intensity of negative feelings about being exposed to a terror 
attack ranged from 0.63 to 0.85 and the reliability of the scale was found as 0.92.  
The item-total correlations of the affect scale measuring the intensity of negative 
feelings about a terror attack that may occur in the country ranged from 0.67 to 
0.82 and the reliability of the scale was found as 0.92. The item-total correlations 
of the affect scales demonstrated adequate item effectivity because correlations 
were above 0.21. In addition, the measurement of the affect scales can be 
considered reliable because tests with reliabilities were above 0.70.  
 
The mean ratings and standard deviations of each of the affect scales were 
computed. In addition, the items of perceived likelihood and probability in 
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percentages were combined. The significance of the difference in mean ratings 
between the risk of being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack in the 
country were assessed by repeated measures ANOVA. The demographic and 
background variables; gender, experience with terror attacks and perceived 
knowledge of terror attacks in the country were controlled during the analysis. 
Main effect for threat, F(3, 291) = 12.43, p < .001, reached significance. Table 12 
presents the results of univariate F tests for negative affect, perceived likelihood 
and perceived severity for each threat (being exposed to a terror attack and a terror 
attack that may occur in the country).  
 
Table 12. Mean ratings and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the negative 
affect scales, perceived likelihood and severity items, and univariate Fs for being 
exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur in Israel (n = 298). 
 
 Being exposed 
to a 
terror attack 
 
A terror attack 
in Israel 
 
 
F-statistic 
 
 
p-value 
Negative affect 3.59 (1.49) 
 
3.92 (1.44) .38 .540 
Likelihood 2.94 (1.19) 
 
5.81 (1.37) 37.50 .000 
Severity 5.81 (1.28) 
 
4.68 (1.59) 3.08 .080 
 
The findings presented in Table 12 indicate that the Israeli participants 
perceived the risk of a terror attack that may occur in their country more likely 
than that of personally being exposed to a terror attack. No significant differences 
were found between these two risks in the mean ratings of the negative affect and 
perceived severity. 
  67 
Correlations between emotions and cognitions: Pearson correlations 
between the negative affect scores and the perceived likelihood, and perceived 
severity scores about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that 
may occur in the country were computed. The demographic and background 
variables; gender, experience with terror attacks and perceived knowledge of 
terror attacks in the country were controlled during the analysis.  Table 13 
provides Pearson correlations between emotions and cognitions about the risk of 
terror attacks.  
 
Table 13.  Pearson correlations between emotions and cognitions (n = 298). 
 
 Being exposed to a 
terror attack 
 
A terror attack 
in Israel 
Cognitions r r 
Likelihood .36 
 
.24 
Severity .35 
 
.33 
*p < .001 for all Pearson correlations 
 
Findings in Table 13 show that the more negative emotions Israeli 
participants expressed, the stronger they perceived the likelihood and severity of 
being exposed to a terror attack and of a terror attack that may occur in their 
country. These correlations were found to be significant (p < .001). Fisher r-to-z 
transformation was applied to find out significant differences between the 
correlations for being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur 
in the country. No significant differences were found between the correlations in 
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the negative affect-likelihood, and negative affect- severity relationships (z = 
1.60, p = .11 and z = .27, p = .79, respectively).  
 
Demographic and background differences in mean ratings of TRPS 
scores: No significant age differences in mean ratings of TRPS scores were found. 
However, significant differences were obtained for terror experience, perceived 
knowledge of terror attacks in Israel, and gender. The participants with terror 
experiences perceived the risk of a terror attack more likely (M = 6.19, SD = 1.08) 
than those without terror experiences (M = 5.65, SD = 1.45, F = 9.65, p < .01). 
Israeli participants who presented themselves as having greater knowledge of 
terror attacks in Israel perceived the risk of a terror attack that may occur in their 
country less severe (M = 4.56, SD = 1.56) compared to those with less perceived 
knowledge (M = 4.97, SD = 1.63, F = 4.17, p < .05). Gender differences were 
found in all TRPS scores except for the perceived likelihood of a terror attack that 
may occur in the country. Gender differences in mean ratings of TRPS scores are 
presented in Table 14. 
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Table 14. Gender differences in mean ratings of TRPS scores in the Israeli sample 
(n = 298). 
 
 Being exposed to a 
terror attack 
 
 
A terror attack in Israel 
 Male 
(n=105) 
 
Female 
(n=193) 
F- 
statistic 
Male 
(n=105) 
Female 
(n=193) 
F-
statistic 
Affect 2.95 
 
3.94 33. 72** 3.41 4.19 21.80** 
Likelihood 2.54 
 
3.15 18.98** 5.81 5.80 0.02 
Severity 5.51 
 
5.97 8.81* 3.90 5.11 45.24** 
* p < .01, ** p < .001 
 
 
Table 14 indicates that Israeli female participants were more emotional 
about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that may occur in 
their country compared to their male counterparts.  Similarly, the females 
perceived the severity of consequences stronger for both risks than the males.  
Furthermore, the female respondents perceived the risk of being exposed to a 
terror attack more likely than the male respondents. No significant association was 
found between gender and perceived likelihood of a terror attack that may occur 
in the country. 
 
Perception of the consequences scales: Exploratory principal-components 
factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted on the 16 items of the 
consequences scale in the TRPS. Based on Cattell’s scree test, a two factor 
solution appeared to be the best choice for the factorial structure. Table 15 
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provides the factor loadings and item-total correlations of the 16-item scale in the 
Israeli sample. 
 
Table 15. Factor loadings and item-total correlations of the consequences scale in the 
Israeli sample (n = 298).  
 
 Factor loadings  
Item  
I 
 
II 
Item-total 
correlations 
My life wouldn’t be the same as it was 
before 
.82 
 
 .74 
My position at work would be endangered .66 
 
 .59 
I would face psychological problems .82  .74 
I would need help from close others to 
cope with this trauma 
.75 
 
 .67 
I would very often catch myself thinking 
about my terrorist attack experience 
.80 
 
 .73 
My relationship with close others would 
be threatened 
.56 
 
 .50 
I would be physically disabled .76  .66 
My financial situation would get worse .70  .63 
Public panic in our country  .73 .64 
Decrease or pause in investments of 
foreign or local investors 
 
 
.77 .68 
Loss of trust in government institutions  .78 .72 
War against another country   .63 .54 
War in our country  .65 .56 
An earlier election in our country   .70 .61 
Decrease in the earnings of tourism  .63 .54 
Economic crisis in our country  .83 .76 
 
Table 15 demonstrates that the ranges of factor loadings were 0.56-0.82 
for being exposed to a terror attack and 0.63-0.83 for a terror attack in the country. 
The loadings can be considered as statistically meaningful in representing a 
particular factor. Accordingly, the two factors represented consequences for 
oneself and for the country. The ranges of item-total correlations of the 
consequences scales about being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack in 
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the country were 0.50-0.74, and 0.54-0.76, respectively. These correlations 
indicated adequate item effectivity since they were above 0.21. The reliabilities of 
the consequences scales were found to be 0.88 and 0.77, respectively. Both scales 
may be considered as reliable given the generally accepted benchmark of 0.70.  
 
The difference in mean ratings between the risk of being exposed to a 
terror attack (M = 4.53, SD = 1.22) and a terror attack that may occur in the 
country (M = 4.49, SD = 1.13) were assessed by repeated measures MANOVA. 
However, no significant difference was found between these two risks in the 
“perceived likelihood of consequences” (F = .95, p = .330). 
 
 
5.3.3. Comparison of the Turkish and Israeli Samples on Risk 
Perception of Terror Attacks 
 
Internal structure of the affect scales. The measurement of each of the affect 
scales in TRPS can be considered reliable because reliabilities were above 0.70 in 
the Turkish and Israeli samples.  
 
Comparison of the mean ratings for being exposed to a terror attack with 
those for a terror attack that may occur in the country: Both the Turkish and 
Israeli participants perceived the risk of a terror attack that may occur in their 
countries more likely than the risk of being exposed to a terror attack. 
Furthermore, no significant differences were found in negative affect and 
perceived severity ratings between the two risks. 
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MANOVA was applied to compare the TRPS scores of the Turkish and 
Israeli samples. Because of the significant differences in age and experience with 
terror attacks between the two samples, the analyses were controlled for the 
effects of these variables. The mean ratings of TRPS scores and the difference in 
mean ratings between the Turkish and Israeli samples for being exposed to a terror 
attack are reported in Table 16.  
 
Table 16.  Mean ratings of TRPS scores and the difference in mean ratings between 
the Turkish and Israeli samples about being exposed to a terror attack. 
 
 Turkey 
(n = 536) 
 
Israel 
(n = 298) 
 
F-statistic 
 
p-value 
Negative affect 3.99  
 
3.59  5.33* .021 
Likelihood 3.14 
  
2.94  3.30 .070 
Severity 6.10  
 
5.81  9.84* .002 
 
MANOVA analysis identified significant differences between the Turkish 
and Israeli samples on negative affect and perceived severity about being exposed 
to a terror attack.  Table 16 shows that the Turkish participants were more 
emotional (F = 5.33, p < 0.05) and perceived this risk more severe (F = 9.84, p < 
0.01) than the Israeli respondents. No significant difference between the two 
samples was obtained in perceived likelihood of being exposed to a terror attack.  
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Table 17 provides the mean ratings of TRPS scores and the difference in 
mean ratings between the Turkish and Israeli samples about a terror attack that 
may occur in the country.  
 
Table 17.  Mean ratings of TRPS scores and the difference in mean ratings between 
the Turkish and Israeli samples about a terror attack that may occur in the country. 
 
 Turkey 
(n = 536) 
 
Israel 
(n = 298) 
 
F-statistic 
 
p-value 
Negative 
affect 
4.66  
 
3.92  33.49** .000 
Likelihood 5.52  
 
5.81  1.21 .272 
Severity 6.04  
 
4.68  98.00** .000 
 
MANOVA analysis yielded significant differences between the Turkish 
and Israeli samples on negative affect and perceived severity about a terror attack 
that may occur in the country.  Table 17 indicates that the Turkish participants 
were more emotional (F = 33. 49, p < 0.001) and perceived this risk more severe 
(F = 98.00, p < 0.001) than the Israeli respondents. No significant differences 
between the two samples were found in the perceived likelihood of a terror attack 
that may occur in the country. 
 
Correlations between emotions and cognitions: The more negative 
emotions the Turkish and Israeli participants expressed the more likely and severe 
they perceived the risk of being exposed to a terror attack and that of a terror 
attack that may occur in the country. These correlations were found to be 
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significant in both samples. The differences between the two samples on emotion-
cognition correlations were assessed by Fisher r-to-z transformation. Significant 
differences between the two samples were found in the negative affect-perceived 
severity correlations for being exposed to a terror attack (z = 2.10, p = .03) and a 
terror attack that may occur in the country (z = 2.22, p = .02). However, no 
significant differences between the two samples were obtained in the correlations 
of negative affect-likelihood correlations. Compared to the Turkish participants, 
the Israeli respondents’ emotions were more strongly related to their severity 
perceptions about terrorism risk.  
 
Relationships between TRPS scores and demographic, and background 
variables: Age was not related to the TRPS scores in both samples, whereas 
gender was significantly related to all TRPS scores except for the perceived 
likelihood of a terror attack that may occur in the country. The Turkish and Israeli 
female respondents were more emotional about the both risks compared to their 
male counterparts. The females in both samples perceived the severity of these 
risks stronger than the males. Furthermore, they perceived the risk of being 
exposed to a terror attack significantly more likely than the males. No significant 
association was found between gender and perceived likelihood of a terror attack 
that may occur in the country in both samples.  
 
The reported experiences and perceived knowledge of terror attacks of the 
Turkish and Israeli respondents were not related to the TRPS scores about being 
exposed to a terror attack. Furthermore, their perceived knowledge of terror 
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attacks in other countries was not related to the TRPS scores of a terror attack that 
may occur in the country. 
 
Perceptions of the likelihood of consequences: Exploratory principal-
components factor analysis with varimax rotation was conducted on the 16-item 
consequence scale. Based on Cattell’ scree test, a two factor solution appeared to 
be the best choice for the factorial structure in both samples. Half of the items 
were possible consequences of being exposed to a terror attack, whereas the other 
half involved a terror attack that may occur in the country. Nonetheless, no 
significant differences were found between these two risks in the Turkish and 
Israeli samples. 
 
MANOVA was applied to compare the perceived likelihood of 
consequences scores of the Turkish and Israeli samples. Because of the significant 
differences in age and experience with terror attacks between the two samples, the 
analyses were controlled for the effects of these variables. MANOVA analysis 
identified significant differences between the two samples on perceived likelihood 
of the consequences about being exposed to a terror attack (F = 11.48, p < 0.01) 
and about a terror attack that may occur in the country (F = 14.31, p < 0.001). 
Turkish participants perceived the consequences about being exposed to a terror 
attack and about a terror attack that may occur in the country more likely than the 
Israeli respondents.  
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5.4. The Relationship between Values and Risk Perception  
 
The findings regarding the relationship between values and risk perception are 
outlined in three sections. In the first, the relationships between the Turkish 
respondents’ values and risk perceptions are introduced. In the second, the 
relationships between the Israeli respondents’ values and risk perceptions are 
presented. In the last, the findings about the two samples are compared. 
 
 
5.4.1. The Relationship between Values and Risk Perception i n the 
Turkish Sample 
 
Pearson correlations between eight value types and risk perception were 
computed. The mean of all value items was used as a covariate to control for 
individual differences in using the response scale. In addition, the demographic 
and background variables were used as covariates to hold their effects constant on 
values and risk perception. Table 18 presents the partial correlations of the 
Turkish participants’ values with negative affect, perceived likelihood, and 
perceived severity about being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that 
may occur in the country. 
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Table 18. Correlations between Turkish respondents’ values and risk perceptions 
about being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur in the 
country (n = 536). 
 
 Being exposed to a terror attack 
 
A terror attack in Turkey 
 
 Negative 
Affect 
 
Likelihood 
 
Severity 
 
Negative 
Affect 
 
Likelihood 
 
Severity 
 
Power -.02 
 
-.04 
 
.01 
 
-.01 
 
-.05 
 
.00 
 
Achievement .00 
 
-.01 
 
.02 
 
.02 
 
.06 
 
.02 
 
Stimulation 
& 
Hedonism 
-.08 
 
-.09* 
 
-.01 
 
-.11** 
 
-.10* 
 
-.04 
 
Self-
Direction 
-.11** 
 
.03 
 
-.04 
 
-.12** 
 
.08 
 
-.13** 
 
Universalism -.00 
 
.08 
 
.02 
 
.04 
 
.04 
 
-.03 
 
Benevolence 
& 
Conformity 
-.01 
 
.02 
 
-.01 
 
.05 
 
-.03 
 
.10* 
 
Tradition .09* 
 
.02 
 
-.02 
 
-.06 
 
-.05 
 
.02 
 
Security .09* 
 
.02 
 
.11** 
 
.11** 
 
-.03 
 
.15** 
 
Hypothesized correlations are emphasized in bold. **p < .01, *p < .05, one tailed for predicted 
associations, two tailed for nonpredicted associations. 
 
The first research hypothesis predicted a negative relationship between 
self-direction value type and negative affect about being exposed to a terror 
attack. The findings presented in Table 18 supported this hypothesis. The more 
importance Turkish respondents attributed to self-direction values, the less 
emotional they felt about the risk for oneself (r = -.11, p < .05). 
 
The second research hypothesis predicted negative correlations of self-
direction and stimulation values with perceived likelihood of being exposed to a 
terror attack. Conversely, positive correlations were expected between tradition, 
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conformity, and security values and perceived likelihood. The findings provided 
in Table 18 partly support this hypothesis. Hedonism & stimulation values had 
significant negative correlations with perceived likelihood (r = -.09, p < .05), 
whereas the correlation for self-direction values was not significant. The more 
priority Turkish participants gave to hedonism & stimulation values, the less 
likely they perceived the risk of being exposed to a terror attack. The correlations 
of benevolence & conformity, tradition and security values with perceived 
likelihood were not significant.  
 
The third research hypothesis predicted negative correlations of 
stimulation values with perceived likelihood of a terror attack that may occur in 
the country. However, positive correlations were hypothesized for tradition, 
conformity and security values. The findings indicate that hedonism & stimulation 
values significantly correlated with the perceived likelihood of the risk for the 
country (r = -.10, p < .05). The more importance Turkish respondents attributed to 
hedonism & stimulation values, the less likely they perceived the risk of a terror 
attack that may occur in their country. In contrast to the hypothesized 
relationships, self-direction, benevolence & conformity, tradition and security 
values did not have significant correlations with perceived likelihood of a terror 
attack that may occur in the country.  
 
The fourth research hypothesis predicted positive correlations of power 
and security values with perceived severity about being exposed to a terror attack. 
Conversely, negative correlations were predicted for universalism, and 
benevolence values. The findings in Table 18 partly support this hypothesis. 
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Security value type exhibited a significant correlation with perceived severity (r = 
.11, p < .01). The greater importance Turkish respondents attributed to security 
values, the more severe they perceived the risk of being exposed to a terror attack. 
No significant correlations were found between power, universalism, and 
benevolence & conformity value types and perceived severity about being 
exposed to a terror attack.  
  
The last research hypothesis predicted positive correlations of 
universalism, benevolence, and security values with perceived severity of a terror 
attack that may occur in the country. The findings showed that benevolence & 
conformity and security values exhibited significant positive correlations with 
perceived severity about a terror attack that may occur in the country (r = .10, p < 
.05 and r = .15, p < .01, respectively). The greater importance Turkish respondents 
attributed to benevolence & conformity and security values, the more severe they 
perceived the risk of a terror attack that may occur in their country. No significant 
correlation was found between universalism values and perceived severity.  
 
The findings regarding the relationship of values with risk perception 
yielded several unpredicted results: Security values exhibited significant 
correlations with negative affect about being exposed to a terror attack (r = .09, 
p<.05) and about a terror attack that may occur in the country (r = .11, p < .01). 
The more importance the Turkish respondents gave to security values, the more 
emotional they felt about these two risks. Furthermore, hedonism & stimulation 
and self-direction values demonstrated significant correlations with negative 
affect about a terror attack that may occur in the country (r = -.11 and r = -.12, p < 
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.01, respectively). The greater priority the Turkish participants attributed to 
hedonism & stimulation and self-direction values, the less emotional they felt 
about the risk for their country. Additionally, self-direction value type exhibited a 
significant negative correlation with perceived severity about a terror that may 
occur in the country (r = -.13, p < .01). The more importance Turkish participants 
attributed to self-direction values, the more severe they perceived the risk of a 
terror attack that may occur in their country. 
 
The relationship between Turkish respondents’ values and risk perceptions 
was further investigated via canonical correlation analysis. The results of this 
analysis indicate that the first canonical correlation linking values and risk 
perception was significant for the risk of a terror attack that may occur in the 
country (Chi-sq24 = 81.74, p < 0.001) but not significant for the risk of being 
exposed to a terror attack (Chi-sq24 = 30.01, p = 0.027). The variability that values 
can accommodate in risk perception (i.e., redundancy) was 2.65% for the risk of a 
terror attack that may occur in the country and 1.05% for the risk of being 
exposed to a terror attack, while the redundancy of risk perception on values was 
5.58% for the threat to one’s country and 2.87% for the threat to oneself.  
 
 
5.4.2. The Relationship between Values and Risk Perception in the 
Israeli Sample  
 
Pearson correlations between seven value types and risk perception were 
computed. The mean of all value items was used as a covariate to control for 
individual differences in using the response scale. In addition, the demographic 
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and background variables were used as covariates to hold their effects constant on 
values and risk perception. Table 19 presents the partial correlations of the Israeli 
respondents’ values with negative affect, perceived likelihood, and perceived 
severity about being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur 
in the country. 
 
Table 19. Correlations between Israeli respondents’ values and risk perceptions 
about being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur in the 
country (n = 298). 
 
 Being exposed to a terror attack 
 
A terror attack in the country 
 
 Negative 
Affect 
 
Likelihood 
 
Severity 
 
Negative 
Affect 
 
Likelihood 
 
Severity 
 
Power & 
Achievement 
.06 
 
-.04 
 
.08 
 
.02 
 
-.18* 
 
.03 
 
Stimulation & 
Hedonism 
-.11 
 
-.15** 
 
.01 
 
-.09 
 
-.20** 
 
-.02 
 
Self-Direction -.14** 
 
-.01 
 
.07 
 
-.12* 
 
.04 
 
-.12* 
 
Universalism -.06 
 
-.09 
 
-.16** 
 
-.02 
 
.09 
 
-.00 
 
Benevolence 
& 
Conformity 
-.04 
 
.09 
 
-.05 
 
-.01 
 
.14** 
 
-.00 
 
Tradition -.09 
 
.24** 
 
-.18* 
 
.09 
 
-.06 
 
.07 
 
Security .18* 
 
.17** 
 
.03 
 
.19** 
 
.14** 
 
.07 
 
Hypothesized correlations are emphasized in bold. **p < .01, *p < .05, one tailed for predicted 
associations, two tailed for nonpredicted associations. 
 
The first research hypothesis predicted a negative relationship between 
self-direction value type and negative affect about being exposed to a terror 
attack. The findings presented in Table 19 support this hypothesis. The more 
importance the Israeli respondents attributed to self-direction values, the less 
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emotional they felt about the risk of being exposed to a terror attack (r = -.14, p < 
.01). 
 
The second research hypothesis predicted negative correlations of self-
direction and stimulation values with the perceived likelihood of being exposed to 
a terror attack. Conversely, positive correlations were expected for tradition, 
conformity, and security values. The findings presented in Table 18 partly support 
this hypothesis. The results suggest a significant negative correlation for 
hedonism & stimulation values (r = -.15, p < .01) but positive correlations for 
tradition and security values (r = .23, p < .001 and r = .16, p < .01, respectively). 
The greater importance the Israeli respondents attributed to hedonism & 
stimulation values, the less likely they perceived the risk of being exposed to a 
terror attack. However, the more priority they gave to tradition and security 
values, the more likely they perceived the risk for themselves. No significant 
correlations were found between self-direction, and benevolence & conformity 
value types and perceived likelihood. 
 
The third research hypothesis predicted negative correlations of 
stimulation values with the perceived likelihood of a terror attack that may occur 
in the country. Conversely, positive correlations were postulated between 
tradition, conformity, and security value types and perceived likelihood of this 
risk. The findings in Table 19 demonstrate a significant negative correlation 
between hedonism & stimulation values and perceived likelihood (r = -.20, p < 
.01) of a terror attack that may occur in the country. Conversely, positive 
correlations were found between benevolence & conformity, and security value 
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types and perceived likelihood of this risk (r = .14 and r = .11, p < .05, 
respectively). The greater priority Israeli participants gave to hedonism & 
stimulation values, the less likely they perceived the risk of terror attacks that may 
occur in their country. However, the more importance they attributed to 
benevolence & conformity and security values, the more likely they perceived the 
risk for their country. No significant results were found for the relationship 
between the self-direction, and tradition value types and perceived likelihood of 
the risk for the country. 
 
The fourth research hypothesis predicted positive correlations of power, 
and security values with perceived severity of being exposed to a terror attack. 
Conversely, negative correlations were predicted between the universalism and 
benevolence values and perceived severity. The findings presented in Table 19 
indicate that universalism values significantly correlated with perceived severity 
about being exposed to a terror attack (r = -.16, p < .01). The more importance the 
Israeli participants attributed to universalism values, the less severe they perceived 
the risk for oneself. No significant associations were found between power, 
security, and benevolence & conformity value types and perceived severity about 
being exposed to a terror attack. 
 
The last research hypothesis predicted positive correlations of 
universalism, benevolence, and security values with perceived severity of a terror 
attack that may occur in the country. The findings presented in Table 19 show that 
this hypothesis was not supported.  
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The findings regarding the relationship of the Israeli respondents’ values 
with their risk perceptions yielded several unpredicted results: Self-direction 
values showed a significant correlation with negative affect about a terror attack 
that may occur in the country (r = -.12, p < .05). The Israeli participants 
attributing more importance to self-direction values felt themselves less emotional 
about this risk. Security values exhibited significant correlations with negative 
affect about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that may 
occur in the country (r = .18, p < .05 and r = .19, p < .01, respectively). The 
greater priority the Israeli respondents attributed to security values, the more 
emotional they felt about both risks. Power & achievement values exhibited 
significant negative correlation with perceived likelihood of a terror attack that 
may occur in the country (r = -.18, p < .01). The more priority Israeli participants 
gave to power & achievement values, the less likely they perceived this risk. The 
results presented in Table 18 demonstrate a significant correlation between 
tradition values and perceived severity of being exposed to a terror attack (r = -
.18, p < .01). The more priority Israeli participants gave to tradition values, the 
less severe they perceived risk for themselves. Furthermore, a negative correlation 
was found between self-direction values and perceived severity of a terror attack 
that may occur in the country (r = -.12, p < .05). This unpredicted finding 
indicates that the greater importance the Israeli respondents gave to self-direction 
values, the less severe they perceived the risk for their country.  
 
The relationship between the Israeli participants’ values and risk 
perceptions was further investigated via canonical correlation analysis. The results 
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of this analysis indicate that the first canonical correlations linking values and risk 
perception about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that 
may occur in the country were significant (Chi-sq21 = 76.13, Chi-sq21 = 59.03, p < 
.001, respectively). The variability that values can accommodate in risk perception 
(i.e., redundancy) was 5.00% for the risk of being exposed to a terror attack and 
3.78% for the risk of a terror attack that may occur in the country, while the 
redundancy of risk perception on values was 7.86% for the threat to one’s country 
and 7.36% for the threat to oneself.  
 
 
5.4.3. Comparison of the Turkish and Israeli Samples on the 
Relationship between Values and Risk Perception  
 
Significant associations between values and risk perception were found in both 
samples. These relationships can be summarized as follows: (1) hedonism & 
stimulation values and perceived likelihood about being exposed to a terror 
attack/a terror attack that may occur in the country; the more priority the Turkish 
and Israeli participants gave to hedonism & stimulation values, the less likely they 
perceived the risk for themselves and for their country. (2) Self-direction values 
and negative affect about being exposed to a terror attack; the greater importance 
the Turkish and Israeli respondents attributed to self-direction values, the less 
emotional they felt about this risk. (3) Security values and negative affect about 
being exposed to a terror attack/a terror attack in the country; the more priority the 
Turkish and Israeli participants gave to security values, the more emotional they 
felt about these two risks. (4) Self-direction values and perceived severity of a 
terror attack that may occur in the country; the greater importance Turkish and 
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Israeli respondents attributed to self-direction values, the more severe they 
perceived the risk for their country. The findings (1) and (2) are in compliance 
with the research hypotheses, whereas (3) and (4) are unpredicted results. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
 
In this dissertation, the relationship between values and risk perception of terror 
attacks were examined in two countries, Turkey and Israel. These countries share 
an ongoing threat of terror attacks but differ in their socio-cultural-backgrounds. 
The research composed of three parts. In the first part, the organization of the 
specific items and basic values was compared with the theoretical prototype. The 
risk perceptions of terror attacks for oneself and for the country were assessed in 
the second part. Finally, the relationship between values and risk perception was 
examined in the last part. 
  
The organization of this chapter is as follows: in the first part a general 
discussion about the major findings on values, risk perception and the associations 
of values with risk perception is provided. In addition, the limitations of the 
current research are presented. Conclusions and implications are introduced in the 
second part.  
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6.1. General Discussion 
 
 
6.1.1. Values 
 
SSA analyses yielded six distinct and two joint value regions in the Turkish 
sample. Tradition, universalism, self-direction, achievement, power, and security 
values formed distinct regions in the SSA map of the Turkish sample. However, 
stimulation values with hedonism values and conformity values with benevolence 
values formed joint regions.  
 
The defining goal of the hedonism value type is the pleasure or sensuous 
gratification for oneself. It shares elements of both openness to change (independent 
action, thought and feeling) and self-enhancement (pursuit of self-interests) 
(Schwartz, 1994). Current research yields hedonism as closer to openness to change 
since it forms a joint region with stimulation. This joint value type, labeled 
hedonism & stimulation entails a desire for affectively pleasant arousal. 
Benevolence values emphasize voluntary concern for others’ welfare; whereas 
conformity values stress self-restraint in everyday interaction, usually with close 
others. These two values that formed a joint region in the current research are 
labeled “benevolence & conformity.” This value type promotes cooperative and 
supportive social relationships (Schwartz, 2005a). 
 
The space of the SSA map in the Israeli sample was partitioned into four 
distinct and three joint regions. The values of tradition, universalism, self-
direction, and security formed distinct regions whereas stimulation values with 
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hedonism values, conformity values with benevolence values, and power values 
with achievement values mixed to form joint regions. Power and achievement 
values are grouped in the self-enhancement value priority. Power values 
emphasize the attainment or preservation of a dominant position within the more 
general social system whereas achievement values stress the active demonstration 
of successful performance in concrete interaction. The joint value type, containing 
power and achievement values was labeled “power & achievement.” This value 
type focuses on social superiority and esteem (Schwartz, 1994). 
 
All the value regions in the Turkish and Israeli samples were formed in 
accordance with the partitioning criteria of Schwartz (2005a). When a value did 
not form a distinct region, it almost always formed a joint region with one of the 
two values with which it is adjacent in the prototypical circle and with which it 
shares much of its motivational significance. For example, benevolence values did 
not form a distinct region in the Turkish and Israeli samples. However, these 
values formed a joint region with conformity values to with which they are 
adjacent. Schwartz (2005a) reported that benevolence values formed distinct 
regions in 67% of the 210 samples and joint regions in 33% of these samples. 
Stimulation values formed distinct regions in 70% of the 210 samples and joint 
regions in 29% of these samples. Power values formed distinct regions in 91% of 
the 210 samples and joint regions in 8% of these samples. The current findings of 
this research thus support the claim that in most of the cultures studied, people 
responded to ten types of values as distinct and that the broader value orientations 
captured by adjacent values were distinguished nearly universally (Schwartz, 
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2005a). In the present study, tradition values in both samples and power values in 
the Turkish sample were located toward the periphery of the two-dimensional 
space rather than extending into the common origin. This result is in line with the 
finding that tradition values emerged outside conformity values in 29 of the 36 
samples and power values appeared behind the achievement values in 26 of the 37 
samples (Schwartz, 1992). Consequently, the organization of specific items and 
basic values in both samples is similar but not identical to the theoretical 
prototype. This finding demonstrates a comprehensive and near universal set of 
values identified by the theory. Therefore, the hypothesized relationships between 
values and risk perception can be examined.  
 
The results about the ranks of values of the two samples demonstrated that 
self-direction, security, and benevolence & conformity were among the three most 
highly rated value types in both samples with self-direction being the most highly 
rated. Security was the second most highly rated value type in the Turkish sample 
and the third in the Israeli sample. Benevolence & conformity was the third in the 
Turkish sample, although it was the second in the Israeli sample. The lowest rated 
value type in both samples was tradition. 
 
Self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan, 1995) may shed 
some light on the high importance of benevolence and self-direction values across 
the Turkish and Israeli samples. This theory argues that relatedness, community, 
autonomy, and personal growth are major psychological needs whose fulfillment 
is intrinsically satisfying. Consequently, the goals to which these needs direct us 
are salient and central to most people. Benevolence and self-direction values, 
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respectively, express goals based on relatedness and community and on autonomy 
and personal growth. Furthermore, security and conformity values are important 
in both samples, probably in order to ensure harmonious relationships among 
group members by avoiding conflict and the violation of group norms. Similarly, 
accepting and acting on tradition values contribute to group solidarity and thus to 
smooth group functioning and survival (Schwartz and Bardi, 2001). However, 
tradition values largely concern individuals’ commitments to the abstract beliefs 
and symbols that represent groups (Schwartz, 1992). These values find little 
expression in everyday social behavior. Hence, the Turkish and Israeli 
respondents attributed relatively low importance to tradition values as guiding 
principles in their lives. 
 
The pattern of the lowest and highest rated value types in the current 
research are similar but not identical to those observed around the world. 
Schwartz and Bardi (2001) found that average value hierarchies of representative 
and near representative samples from 13 nations exhibit a similar pattern, which 
they replicated with schoolteachers in 56 nations and college students in 54 
nations. Benevolence, self-direction, and universalism values were most 
important; stimulation, tradition, and power values were least important; and 
security, conformity, achievement, and hedonism were in between. It should be 
noted that the values hierarchy that Schwartz and Bardi (2001) used contained 
distinct values (eg., benevolence, conformity) rather than joint values (e.g., 
benevolence & conformity). In the current research, the existence of joint values 
may cause differences in the value hierarchies of both samples. For example, 
  92 
benevolence was found to be the most highly rated value type (Schwartz and 
Bardi, 2001). However, it was combined with conformity values in the current 
research and became the second highest rated value type.  
 
The main difference between the current findings and the previous ones 
(Schwartz and Bardy, 2001) is the location of the security value type.  It is among 
the most highly rated value types in the current research, whereas it is located in 
the middle of the values hierarchy in the former study. The debriefings provided 
to the Turkish and Israeli respondents prior to the survey research may have led 
them to attribute more importance to security values and, in turn, have made this 
value type rate among the highest in the current research.  
 
An interesting finding in this research is the close location of the self- 
direction and security values in the values hierarchy of the Turkish sample. 
Schwartz and Bardy (2001) argued that it is unlikely that the security value type is 
located very close to the self-direction value type in the values hierarchy. The 
authors proposed three requirements by considering human nature and societal 
functioning. The most important requirement is to preserve, and supporting 
relationships among members of primary groups. For example, the security value 
type is acquired for self-restriction, avoiding risks, and maintaining the status quo, 
because harmonious relationships among group members depend on avoiding 
conflict and violations of group norms. The second requirement is spending the 
time and the physical and intellectual effort needed to perform productive work. 
For example, self-direction values promote independence of thought and action, 
exploration, and creativity to find the best ways to achieve group tasks. The last 
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requirement is the gratification of the self-oriented needs and desires of group 
members. For example, hedonism is a social transformation of the needs of the 
individual, as a biological organism for physical gratification and optimal arousal. 
These propositions demonstrate that security value type may weaken motivation 
for the second requirement, “performing productive work.” Therefore, it may not 
locate very close to the self-direction value type in the values hierarchy. However, 
Kağıtçıbaşı (2005) asserted that relatedness (first requirement) and autonomy 
(second requirement) can coexist and pointed to the autonomous-related self as a 
healthy developmental model. In congruence with this view, several studies 
conducted in Turkey demonstrated the coexistence of traditional collectivist 
values with newly arising individualistic values (Aygün and İmamoğlu, 2002; 
İmamoğlu and Aygün, 1999; İmamoğlu, 1998). Accordingly, the close location of 
the self-direction and security value types in the value hierarchy of the Turkish 
sample supports claims of other studies conducted in Turkey.  
 
The findings regarding the associations of other values with gender 
indicated that the Turkish male respondents attributed greater priority to power, 
achievement, hedonism & stimulation and tradition values than their female 
counterparts. However, they gave less importance to universalism and 
benevolence & conformity values than did the female respondents. No significant 
relationships were found between gender and the self-direction and security value 
types in the Turkish sample. Furthermore, Israeli male participants gave more 
importance to self-direction and tradition values than their female counterparts. In 
the Israeli sample, no significant relationships were found between gender and 
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power & achievement, hedonism & stimulation, universalism, and benevolence & 
conformity and security value types. The results suggest that the gender-specific 
attribution of importance to values is more striking in the Turkish sample than in 
the Israeli sample.  
 
Past studies have yielded mixed results regarding gender differences in 
value priorities. One group of studies found significant differences for gender (eg., 
Schwartz and Rubel, 2005; Feather, 2004 and Ryckman and Houston, 2003); 
whereas other studies reported no significant gender differences (eg., Aygün and 
Imamoğlu and Prince-Gibson and Schwartz, 1998). In one of these studies, it was 
found that men attributed more importance than women to self-enhancement 
values (power, achievement) and openness values (self-direction, stimulation and 
hedonism); women attributed more importance to self-transcendence values 
(universalism, benevolence); and men and women differed less regarding 
conservation values (security, tradition, conformity), although women favored 
security and tradition somewhat more (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005). In this study, 
the data from 127 adult and student samples in 70 countries were analyzed to 
assess gender differences in the importance of 10 basic values.  
 
The current findings regarding the Israeli sample confirm the trends in the 
past research that reported gender similarities rather than differences in the 
importance of values. However, findings about the Turkish sample support 
previous research that found significant gender differences.  
The gender similarities reported in the previous studies were attributed to 
several factors, in particular, working with small sample sizes, homogenous 
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samples and student samples applying different instruments; and cultural 
differences among the samples. Furthermore, working with students samples was 
suggested to be the main source of the similarity because gender effects in student 
samples were smaller than those in adult samples (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005).  
 
The current findings about the Israeli sample indicated gender similarity in 
the importance of values. It may be argued that studying a sample of Israeli 
students would lead to gender similarity in values. However, the findings about 
the Turkish student sample do not support this argument, because of the revealed 
gender differences in the importance of values. Additionally, the findings about 
the Turkish sample are highly consistent with those reported by Schwartz and 
Rubel (2005). Therefore, generating and testing further explanations for the 
inconsistent pattern of variation in gender differences in values is a challenge for 
future research. 
 
 
6.1.2. Risk Perception of Terror Attacks  
 
Risk perception of terror attacks was measured by asking respondents about the 
intensity of their negative feelings, perceived likelihood, and perceived severity 
about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that may occur in 
their country. The Turkish and Israeli participants perceived the risk for their 
country significantly more likely than the risk for themselves. However, no 
significant differences were found between these risks in the negative affect and 
perceived severity ratings.  
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The difference in the perceived likelihood ratings may be explained by the 
“realism” of the Turkish and Israeli respondents. A subjective judgment is called 
realistic if it is relies on a rational account of the external stimulus information 
available (Peeters et al., 1997). Furthermore, judgments based on negative 
information are said to be more realistic than judgments based on positive 
information (Lewicka, 1988). The Turkish and Israeli respondents are exposed to 
an ongoing threat of terror attacks and hence are subject to external information 
about terror events in their countries. Therefore, they can make realistic judgments 
about the likelihood of terror attacks that may occur in their countries and 
realistically predict that their likelihood of being exposed to a terror attack is 
significantly less than a terror attack that may occur in the country. 
  
The findings of the unrealistic optimism literature may also explain the 
difference in the perceived likelihood ratings regarding the two risks. Unrealistic 
optimism (Weinstein, 1980) is the tendency for people to report that they are less 
likely than others to experience negative events. Unrealistic optimism has been 
indicated for a variety of events (Helweg-Larsen and Shepperd, 2001), and across 
a wide variety of samples (Perloff, 1987) and cultures (Peeters et. al., 1997). Two 
main explanations are suggested for unrealistic optimism. The first describes 
unrealistic optimism as a self-enhancing motivational bias to protect self-esteem, 
to enhance a positive social image, or to reduce anxiety (Joffe, 1999; Weinstein, 
1980, 1984). The second links unrealistic optimism with unmotivated cognitive 
processes and judgmental biases (Weinstein, 1982) such as the illusion of control 
(Harris, 1996). 
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The literature on unrealistic optimism has mainly focused on vulnerability 
perceptions rather than severity, although researchers in this field define risk 
perception as comprising both vulnerability and severity. One exception is a study 
conducted by Rimal and Morrison (2006). These authors examined how perceived 
vulnerability and perceived severity differed in terms of how individuals gauge 
their personal risk relative to others. It was found that vulnerability ratings 
increased as levels of dissimilarity between oneself and a referent increased but 
this monotonic pattern was not observed for severity ratings. In line with this 
finding, it may be argued that unrealistic optimism holds for probability 
judgments but does not hold for severity judgments. Therefore, the Turkish and 
Israeli respondents perceived the risk of a terror attack that may occur in their 
country significantly more likely than the risk of being exposed to a terror attack 
because they are optimistically biased. However, no significant difference was 
found between the two risks in the ratings of perceived severity and negative 
affect, because unrealistic optimism may not hold for severity and negative affect.  
 
Comparison of the Turkish and Israeli samples on terror risk perception 
showed similarities and differences between the two cultures. Figure 4 provides 
the comparison of the Turkish and Israeli samples on negative affect.  
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Figure 4. Comparison of the Turkish and Israeli samples on negative affect 
 
 
Figure 4 indicates that the Turkish participants were more emotional than 
the Israeli respondents about being exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack 
that may occur in the country. This result replicates a previous finding that 
Turkish people expressed more negative affect about terror risk than Israeli 
individuals (Shiloh, et al., 2007). Value priorities were found to influence worries 
by increasing the attention to and perception of threats to valued goals (Schwartz, 
et al., 2000). Accordingly, the importance given to these values may influence the 
intensity of the feelings about terror attacks and one group may feel more 
emotional than the other. Figure 5 presents the comparison of the Turkish and 
Israeli samples on perceived likelihood.  
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Figure 5. Comparison of the Turkish and Israeli samples on perceived likelihood 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates that there is no significant difference between the 
two samples in perceived likelihood of these risks. This result supports the view 
that risks have a common universal dimensional structure, although the cultures 
may differ with regard to the salience of associated factors (Slovic, 1992; Shiloh 
et al., 2007). Figure 6 provides a comparison of the Turkish and Israeli samples on 
perceived severity.  
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Figure 6. Comparison of the Turkish and Israeli samples on perceived severity 
 
Figure 6 shows that the Turkish respondents perceived both risks as more 
severe, compared to their Israeli counterparts. This result contradicts the previous 
finding of no significant difference between the Turkish an Israeli samples in 
perceived severity of terror attacks (Shiloh et al., 2007). In this previous study, a 
more concrete scale consisting of eight items was used to measure the severity 
perceptions of the respondents. Furthermore, the sample size was smaller than the 
one in the current research. Differences in the measurement scale, sample size and 
composition may account for the different results in the two studies on terror risk 
perception. Overall, the present findings about terror risk perception support the 
views presented by the Social Amplification of Risk Framework (Kasperson et al. 
1988) about social processes that affect representations of risks by individuals and 
groups across different cultural/societal contexts.  
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Figures 4 and 5 show that the differences between the two samples in 
negative affect and perceived severity are more salient for a terror attack that may 
occur in the country than for being exposed to a terror attack. Therefore, 
cultural/social differences in risk perception may be more striking when the risk is 
for one’s country than when it is for oneself. 
 
Significant associations were found between gender and terror risk 
perception. In both samples, females reported more negative emotions and 
severity than their male counterparts about the risk of being exposed to a terror 
attack and a terror attack that may occur in the country. In addition, the females 
perceived the risk of being exposed to a terror attack to be more likely than did the 
males. These results are consistent with gender differences in terror risk 
perception reported in previous research. Turkish and Israeli females perceived 
more costs and vulnerability, as well as expressing more negative affect about the 
risk of terror attacks (Shiloh et al., 2007). Higher perceived risk of terror attacks 
was associated with the female gender in Britain (Goodwin, et al., 2005), and in 
the United States, gender differences in emotions associated with gender 
differences in perceived terror risk (Lerner, et al., 2003).  
 
One interesting finding of the current research is that gender in the Turkish 
and Israeli respondents was not related to the perceived likelihood of the risk for 
one’s country, whereas it was related to the perceived likelihood of the risk for 
oneself. In congruence with this finding, Goodwin, et al., (2005) found significant 
correlation between gender and the perceived probability of a terror threat to 
oneself but no significant correlation about a terror threat to Britain. Individual 
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actions can rarely affect the perceived threats that give rise to societal or global 
problems (Schwartz, et al., 2000). Turkish and Israeli people share an ongoing 
threat of terror attacks. In addition, the perceived risk of British people about a 
major terror attack that may occur in Britain was raised significantly after the 9/11 
attacks and the US invasion of Iraq (Goodwin et al., 2005). Therefore, it may be 
argued that gender difference in the perceived likelihood of the threat to one’s 
country may not exist in cultures that live under the threat of terror attacks. 
However, more cross-cultural research is needed to generate and test explanations 
for the non-significant association of gender with the perceived likelihood of a 
threat to one’s country.  
 
 
6.1.3. The Relationship between Values and Risk Perception 
 
Five hypotheses were postulated to investigate the relationship between values 
and the risk perception of terror attacks. Pearson correlations were computed to 
discover if these hypotheses were supported. The major findings, inferences from 
these findings, and additional approaches that might explain them are presented in 
three groups: predicted associations that revealed a consistent pattern in both 
samples, unpredicted associations that revealed a consistent pattern in both 
samples, and predicted associations that were supported in either one of the 
samples. Finally, limitations of the present study and ideas for future research are 
presented. 
 
Predicted associations that revealed a consistent pattern in both samples: 
Self-direction and hedonism & stimulation value types exhibited significant 
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relationships with risk perception in both samples. It was found that the greater 
priority the Turkish and Israeli participants attributed to self-direction values, the 
less emotional they felt about being exposed to a terror attack. Furthermore, the 
more importance they attributed to hedonism & stimulation values, the less likely 
they perceived the risk of being exposed to a terror attack and that of a terror 
attack that may occur in the country. Self-direction values did not demonstrate 
significant correlations with perceived likelihood about these risks in the Turkish 
and Israeli samples.  
 
Self-direction values together with stimulation and hedonism values 
express people’s readiness to accept and desire to pursue new, challenging, and 
uncertain outcomes (Schwartz et al., 2000). Although these values together 
emphasize openness to change, the organismic needs from which they are derived 
different. Self-direction values stem from organismic needs for control and 
mastery, however, hedonism & stimulation values originate from organismic 
needs for variety, stimulation, and pleasure (Schwartz, 1994). The emphasis of 
self-direction values on control and mastery may impede a negative affect 
whereas the focus of hedonism & stimulation values on affective pleasure may 
reduce the perceived likelihood of a terror attack. 
 
The former argument supports the claim that self-control traits are 
negatively related to negative affect (Olson, 2005). Self-control is a higher-order 
personality trait dimension that was obtained from the factor analysis of the big 
five personality traits (Digman, 1997; Carrol, 2002). Self-control reflects 
interpersonal self-control (agreeableness), emotional self-control (emotional 
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stability), and task-oriented self-control (conscientiousness). Emotional self-
control helps one to be adaptive to external threat, imminent danger, and potential 
loss and control distressing emotions. Thus, self-control minimizes the experience 
of negative emotions. 
 
The latter argument that the emphasis of hedonism & stimulation values 
on affective pleasure may reduce the perceived likelihood of a terror attack 
supports the view that sensation seeking is negatively correlated with the 
perceived likelihood of threats. Sensation seeking is “a trait defined by the seeking 
of varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the 
willingness to take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such 
experience” (Zuckerman, 1994). Strong correlations were found between 
sensation seeking and risk taking (Johnson et al., 2002; Rolison, et al., 2003; 
VanZile et al., 2006). High sensation seekers interpreted the world differently than 
non-sensation seekers. Low sensation seekers appraised risky or stressful 
situations as threatening and as leading to negative consequences, whereas high-
sensation seekers appraised the environment as less threatening (Roberti, 2004). 
For example, in one study high sensation seekers rated their risk of being a victim 
of a crime or a violent act as low compared to low sensation seekers (Horvath and 
Zuckerman, 1993).  
 
Unpredicted associations that revealed a consistent pattern in both 
samples: Security values correlated positively with negative affect about being 
exposed to a terror attack and a terror attack that may occur in the country. The 
greater priority the Turkish and Israeli respondents attributed to security values, 
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the more emotional they felt about these risks. Security values emphasize safety, 
harmony, and the stability of society, of relationships, and oneself. They derive 
from basic individual and group requirements (Schwartz, 2005a). Thus, there are 
two subtypes of security values: individual and group. Security values correlated 
positively and consistently across seven samples with the micro (e.g., my getting 
cancer) and macro (e.g., the outbreak of a nuclear war) safety/health worries 
(Schwartz, 2000). Therefore, security values may sensitize feelings about terror 
attacks with regard to oneself and the one’s country.  
 
As hypothesized, self-direction values correlated with negative affect 
about being exposed to a terror attack. However, the finding that these values 
correlated with negative affect about the risk for one’s country was not predicted. 
This unpredicted finding might again be explained by the factor of self-control 
(Olson, 2005). Because emotional self-control helps one to adapt to an external 
threat, imminent danger, and potential loss, it may control distressing emotions 
about a threat both to oneself and to one’s country. It follows that the Turkish and 
Israeli participants, who attributed more importance to self-direction values felt 
themselves less emotional about both risks. 
 
Self-direction values correlated negatively with the perceived severity of a 
terror attack that may occur in the country. The greater importance the Turkish 
and Israeli respondents gave to self-direction values, the less severe they 
perceived the risk for their country. This relationship needs to be further studied 
because of its consistent pattern across the two samples. 
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Predicted associations supported in either sample: It was postulated that 
security values would correlate positively with perceived severity and perceived 
likelihood about being exposed to a terror attack and about a terror attack that may 
occur in the country. These hypotheses were partly supported in the Turkish and 
Israeli samples. The greater priority the Israeli respondents gave to security 
values, the more likely they perceived the risk for themselves and for their 
country. On the other hand, the more importance the Turkish respondents 
attributed to security values, the more severe they perceived both risks to be.  
 
In the current research, it was found that the Turkish participants attributed 
significantly more importance to security values than did the Israeli respondents 
(F = 15.96, p < .001). This finding supports the claim that security is more highly 
valued by collectivist than by individualist cultures (Probst, 2006). Furthermore, 
in one study, Israel and Turkey were found to be distant from each other on the 
conservatism value dimension (Schwartz, 1999). Turkish people attributed more 
importance to conservatism values compared to their Israeli counterparts. These 
arguments may clarify why security values relate to perceived likelihood in the 
Israeli sample and to severity in the Turkish sample. In the collectivist cultures 
that attribute more importance to security values, the relationship between security 
values and risk perception may be based on perceived severity rather than on 
likelihood. It appears that a fruitful area for future research would be to focus on 
the relationship between security and risk perception in collectivist versus 
individualist cultures.  
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Similar to the findings about the relationship between security and risk 
perception about a terror attack that may occur in the country, the benevolence & 
conformity value type correlated positively with perceived likelihood in the Israeli 
sample but with perceived severity in the Turkish sample. Because the hypotheses 
were postulated for conformity values but the findings were obtained for 
benevolence & conformity values, it may be speculative to discuss this result. 
 
These findings demonstrate that the strength of correlations between 
values and risk perception are low but significant. Nonetheless, the consistent 
pattern of the relationships between the self-direction, hedonism & stimulation 
and security value types and risk perception across the two samples is promising 
for future research.  
 
Participants in this study were university students from Turkey and Israel. 
It is possible that their value structures and representations of terror risk do not 
represent those of people from different demographic and socio-economic 
backgrounds in their countries. It is, therefore, important to be cautious in making 
generalizations from the findings regarding values and risk perception. Further 
research using the current instruments in other groups of people is highly 
desirable.  
 
Current thesis focused on the two cognitive variables in risk perception 
research, perceived likelihood and perceived severity. Future studies may 
investigate the relationship between values and other cognitive variables (eg., trust 
and control), in addition to perceived likelihood and severity. 
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6.2. Conclusions and Implications 
 
Current dissertation involved (1) constructing a survey that measures cognitive 
and emotional components of terror risk perception for oneself and for one’s 
country, and (2) applying this survey together with SVS in two countries with 
terror experience: Turkey and Israel. The consistency of the associations between 
the self-direction, hedonism & stimulation, and security value types and risk 
perception across the two samples provide support for the existence of a link 
between social processes and risk perception. Furthermore, this consistent pattern 
of associations suggests the applicability of Schwartz Value Theory (1992, 1994) 
in risk perception of terror attacks. Differences among the samples in the 
associations of values with risk perception, in particular, the associations of the 
security and benevolence & conformity value types with perceived severity in the 
Turkish sample but with perceived likelihood in the Israeli sample may have 
theoretically interesting causes such as cultural differences in values and in 
normative expressions of risk perception. Investigating such possibilities is 
worthwhile in future research. Furthermore, the TRPS in its current form should 
be improved to include more cognitive components of risk perception (eg., trust 
and control)  and the associations of values with risk perception should be further 
investigated in other cultures to assess the cross-cultural generality of the present 
findings.  
 
The finding that people giving importance to certain values perceive 
terrorism threat differently has potentially important ramifications for targeting of 
relevant communication messages to particular audience. For example, people 
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attributing more importance to security values may require communication 
messages that will reduce their risk perceptions, whereas those giving more 
importance to hedonism & stimulation and self-direction values may require more 
alerting messages to make them prepared for a potential terror attack. Perceptions 
of risk by public officials also appear to play a large role in the examination of 
nation’s preparedness to deal with the threat of terrorism (Slovic, 2003). In 
preparing professionals to provide effective emergency risk communication to an 
anxious public, the importance these professionals attribute to certain values 
should be considered and included in the training plans. Future research on the 
relationship between professionals’ values and their risk perceptions of terror 
attacks may shed more light on this issue. 
 
The finding that hedonism & stimulation values correlate negatively with 
risk perception may have practical implications. Personal threats that pose a 
physical danger are likely to be very affectively arousing and to elicit fear to a 
greater degree (Huddy et al., 2002). This fear may be reduced by organizing 
stimulating activities in the community. Future research that evaluates the 
effectiveness of providing stimulating activities in reducing risk perception may 
provide an effective way of managing the public fear of terrorism. 
 
After the 9/11 attacks, people whose emotional reactions were dominated 
by anger attributed the attacks to fanaticism of the terrorists and to poor US 
security and endorsed an aggressive military response; those whose emotional 
reactions were dominated by sadness or fear expressed reservations about a strong 
military reaction (Sadler et al, 2005). Although this study demonstrated the effects 
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of emotions on policy endorsement, a similar relationship can be predicted 
between values and policy preferences. Thus, people attributing more importance 
to security values may assert more punitive preferences for policies. However, 
those giving more priority to hedonism & stimulation and self-direction values 
may assert more conciliatory preferences. Further research should examine the 
effects of value preferences on policy endorsement about terrorism. 
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VALUE SURVEY 
 
In this questionnaire you are to ask yourself:  "What values are important to ME as 
guiding principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?"  There are 
two lists of values on the following pages.  These values come from different 
cultures.  In the parentheses following each value is an explanation that may help 
you to understand its meaning. 
 
Your task is to rate how important each value is for you as a guiding principle in 
your life.  Use the rating scale below: 
 
0--means the value is not at all important, it is not relevant as a guiding principle for 
you. 
3--means the value is important. 
6--means the value is very important. 
 
The higher the number (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), the more important the value is as a 
guiding principle in YOUR life. 
 
-1 is for rating any values opposed to the principles that guide you. 
 7 is for rating a value of supreme importance as a guiding principle in your 
life; ordinarily there are no more than two such values. 
 
In the space before each value, write the number (-1,0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7) that indicates 
the importance of that value for you, personally.  Try to distinguish as much as 
possible between the values by using all the numbers.  You will, of course, need to 
use numbers more than once. 
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 AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
    opposed                                                                                                                of 
     to my               not                                                                        very             
supreme  
     values          important                        important                      important       
importance 
       -1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                    7   
 
Before you begin, read the values in List I, choose the one that is most important to 
you and rate its importance.  Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your 
values and rate it -1.  If there is no such value, choose the value least important to 
you and rate it 0 or 1, according to its importance.  Then rate the rest of the values 
in List I. 
 
 
VALUES LIST I 
 
1         EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)                              
 
2         INNER HARMONY (at peace with myself)                              
                                                                            
3         SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)                    
                                                                   
4          PLEASURE (gratification of desires)                                      
  
5         FREEDOM (freedom of action and thought)                          
 
6         A SPIRITUAL LIFE (emphasis on spiritual not material matters)     
   
7         SENSE OF BELONGING (feeling that others care about me)        
 
8         SOCIAL ORDER (stability of society)                           
                                                               
9         AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)                   
                                                               
10       MEANING IN LIFE (a purpose in life)                          
 
 
  125 
 AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
opposed                                                                                                              of
to my               not                                                                     very             supreme  
values          important                        important                   important       importance 
     
   -1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                    7  
 
 
11        POLITENESS (courtesy, good manners)                          
 
12        WEALTH (material possessions, money)                      
                                                               
13        NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)      
                                                               
14        SELF RESPECT (belief in one's own worth)                     
                                                              
15        RECIPROCATION OF FAVORS (avoidance of indebtedness)           
                                                               
16____CREATIVITY (uniqueness, imagination)                         
                                                                
17____A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)                  
                                                               
18____RESPECT FOR TRADITION (preservation of time-honored customs)  
                                                               
19____MATURE LOVE (deep emotional & spiritual intimacy)             
                                                               
20____SELF-DISCIPLINE (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)    
                                                              
21____PRIVACY (the right to have a private sphere) 
                                                               
22____FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)                      
                                                               
23____SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)              
                                                               
24____UNITY WITH NATURE (fitting into nature)                      
                                                              
25____A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty and change)     
                                                               
26____WISDOM (a mature understanding of life)                      
                                                               
27____AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)                     
                                                               
28____TRUE FRIENDSHIP (close, supportive friends)                  
                                                               
29____A WORLD OF BEAUTY (beauty of nature and the arts)            
                                                               
30____SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)      
 
  *  *  *  *  *  
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VALUES LIST II 
 
Now rate how important each of the following values is for you as a guiding 
principle in YOUR life.  These values are phrased as ways of acting that may be 
more or less important for you.  Once again, try to distinguish as much as possible 
between the values by using all the numbers. 
   
Before you begin, read the values in List II, choose the one that is most important to 
you and rate its importance.  Next, choose the value that is most opposed to your 
values, or--if there is no such value--choose the value least important to you, and 
rate it -1, 0, or 1, according to its importance.  Then rate the rest of the values. 
 
 
 AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
opposed                                                                                                            of 
to my               not                                                                     very             supreme  
values          important                        important                 important       importance 
     
   -1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                    7   
 
 
31         INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)                   
                                                                
32         MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling & action)              
                                                                
33____LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)                         
                                                                
34____AMBITIOUS (hard-working, aspiring)                                    
                                                               
35____BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)             
                                                       
36____HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)                                    
                                                                        
37____DARING (seeking adventure, risk)                                   
                                                                        
38____PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT (preserving nature)                   
                                                                        
39____INFLUENTIAL (having an impact on people and events)              
                                                                        
40____HONORING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)                 
                                                                       
41____CHOOSING OWN GOALS (selecting own purposes)                      
                                                                        
42____HEALTHY (not being sick physically or mentally)                  
                                                                       
43____CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)                        
                                                                        
44____ACCEPTING MY PORTION IN LIFE (submitting to life's circumstances) 
                                                                        
45____HONEST (genuine, sincere)                                           
                                                                        
46____PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my "face")                
   
47____OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)               
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 AS A GUIDING PRINCIPLE IN MY LIFE, this value is: 
 
opposed                                                                                                           of 
to my               not                                                                     very             supreme  
values          important                        important                   important       importance 
     
   -1                    0           1           2           3           4           5           6                    7   
 
 
48____INTELLIGENT (logical, thinking)                      
 
49____HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)              
 
50____ENJOYING LIFE (enjoying food, sex, leisure, etc.)             
 
51____DEVOUT (holding to religious faith & belief)                     
                                                           
52____RESPONSIBLE (dependable, reliable)                  
 
53____CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)                    
                                                           
54____FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)                             
                                                          
55____SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)                         
                                                           
56____CLEAN (neat, tidy)                                   
 
57____SELF-INDULGENT (doing pleasant things)       
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Terrorism is a major ongoing concern in our country. Hundreds of civilians have been 
killed by terrorist attacks throughout the years. Furthermore, on November 15 and 20, 2003, 
suicide car bomb attacks on two synagogues, the British Consulate and the HSBC Bank 
Headquarters in Istanbul left 52 people dead and over 700 people injured.  
This questionnaire consists of four sections that aim to measure your risk perception 
of terrorist attacks (acts of terrorism against civilians’ lives and properties).  Please read 
the instructions at the beginning of each section carefully before presenting your answers. 
 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
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SECTION 1 
 
Please answer the following questions:  
 
 
Gender: Male   Female  
Age: _____ 
University major: _________________ 
 
 
 
Have you ever been exposed to a terrorist attack? 
  
Yes  *When was it? __________ 
   *Your physical condition:     
    I survived without any injuries   
    I was injured      
    I became physically disabled    
No  
 
 
 
 
Do you have any relatives/friends who were exposed to terrorist attacks? 
   
Yes  *When was it? __________ 
*Degree of your relationship__________ 
   *His/her physical condition:  
    He/she survived without any injuries  
    He/she was injured     
He/she became physically disabled   
    He/she was killed     
 
 No  
 
 
 
What is your level of knowledge about terrorist attacks in Turkey and in other countries? 
 
Terrorist attacks in Turkey   Terrorist attacks in other countries 
I do not have any information at all   I do not have any information at all  
I have some information    I have some information   
I have a lot of information    I have a lot of information   
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SECTION 2 
 
Please indicate the intensity of your feelings about being exposed to a terrorist attack 
within a year by choosing an appropriate number from 1-7 on the scale. 
  
   I do not feel      I strongly feel 
       at all 
 
Fear    1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
   
Helplessness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
   
Anger    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Distress   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Insecurity   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Hopelessness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Sadness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Anxiety   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
Please indicate the intensity of your feelings about a terrorist attack that may occur in 
our country within a year by choosing an appropriate number from 1-7 on the scale. 
 
    I do not feel      I strongly feel 
    at all        
Fear    1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
   
Helplessness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Anger    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Distress   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Insecurity   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Hopelessness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Sadness   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
  
Anxiety   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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SECTION 3 
 
 
Please indicate your ratings for items 1-3 by choosing an appropriate number from 1-7 
on the scale.  
 
    Extremely 
unlikely 
  Extremely 
likely 
1. How likely do you think you will be 
exposed to a terrorist attack within a year? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
2. How likely do you think a typical person 
of your age, sex and background will be 
exposed to a terrorist attack within a year? 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
3. How likely do you think a terrorist attack 
will occur in our country within a year? 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
 
 
 
 
Please indicate probabilities for items 4-6 by choosing a percentage between 0% and 
100% (where 0% indicates impossible to happen and 100% indicates certain to happen). 
 
 
4. Probability that you will be exposed to a terrorist attack within a year: –––– 
5. Probability that a typical person of your age, sex and background will be exposed to a 
terrorist attack within a year: ––––  
6. Probability that a terrorist attack will occur in our country within a year: –––– 
 
 
 
Please indicate your ratings for items 7-8 by choosing an appropriate number from 1-7 
on the scale. 
 
   
Not serious 
at all 
  Extremely 
serious  
7. If you are exposed to a terrorist attack 
within a year, how serious will the 
consequences be for you? 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
8. If a typical person of your age, sex  
and background is exposed to a 
terrorist attack within a year, how 
serious will the consequences be for 
him/her? 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
7 
 
9. If a terrorist attack occurs in our 
country within a year, how serious 
will the consequences be for our 
country?  
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
7 
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SECTION 4 
 
Items 10-17 represent possible consequences you might experience if you were being 
exposed to a terrorist attack within a year. Please indicate your rating of how likely 
each consequence is for you to face by choosing an appropriate number from 1-7 on the 
scale.  
 
 
   Extremely 
unlikely 
 Extremely 
likely 
10. My life wouldn’t be the same as it was 
before 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
11. My position at work would be endangered 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
12. I would face psychological problems 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
13. I would need help from close others  
(eg. spouse, parents, friends) to cope with 
this trauma 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
14. I would very often catch myself thinking 
about my terrorist attack experience 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
15. My relationship with close others  
(eg. spouse, parents, friends)would be 
threatened 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
7 
 
16. I would be physically disabled 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
17. My financial situation would get worse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
 
 
 
Items 18-25 represent possible consequences our country might experience if a terrorist 
attack occurs within a year. Please indicate your rating of how likely each consequence 
is for our country to face by choosing an appropriate number from 1-7 on the scale.  
 
 
   Extremely 
unlikely 
 Extremely 
likely 
18. Public panic in our country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
19. Decrease or pause in investments of 
foreign or local investors 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
20. Loss of trust in government institutions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
21. War against another country  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
22. War in our country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
23. An earlier election in our country  1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
24. Decrease in the earnings of tourism 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
25. Economic crisis in our country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
 
 
 
 
 
